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SNAKE OIL SALESMEN OR PURVEYORS OF
KNOWLEDGE: OFF-LABEL PROMOTIONS
AND THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH
DOCTRINE
Constance E. Bagley,* Joshua Mitts** & Richard J. Tinsley***
The Second Circuit’s December 2012 decision in United States v.
Caronia striking down the prohibition on off-label marketing of pharmaceutical drugs has profound implications for economic regulation in general, calling into question the constitutionality of restrictions on the offer
and sale of securities under the Securities Act of 1933, the solicitation of
shareholder proxies and periodic reporting under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, mandatory labels on food, tobacco, and pesticides,
and a wide range of privacy protections. In this Article we suggest that
Caronia misconstrues the Supreme Court’s holding in Sorrell v. IMS
Health, which was motivated by concerns of favoring one industry participant over another rather than a desire to return to the anti-regulator
fervor of the Lochner era. Reexamining the theoretical justification for
limiting truthful commercial speech shows that a more nuanced approach to regulating off-label marketing with the purpose of promoting
public health and safety would pass constitutional muster. We argue that
as long as the government both has a rational basis for subjecting a
particular industry to limits on commercial speech intended to further a
legitimate public interest, rather than unfounded paternalism, and does
not discriminate against disfavored industry participants, those limits
should be subject to intermediate scrutiny under the Central Hudson
standard. We believe that our articulation of the commercial speech doctrine post-Sorrell will help resolve the current split in the Circuits on the
appropriate standard of review in cases involving both restrictions on
commercial speech and mandated speech. Finally, we critique the
FDA’s 2011 Guidance for Responding to Unsolicited Requests for OffLabel Information (draft) and present a proposal for new rules for regulating the off-label marketing of pharmaceutical drugs based on transparency, the sophistication of the listener and the type of information
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offered, and the requirement that the pharmaceutical company comply
with ongoing duties of training, monitoring, reporting, and auditing.
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INTRODUCTION
In December 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
dealt a potentially fatal blow to the Food and Drug Administration’s ban
on off-label promotions of pharmaceuticals in a sweeping decision with
profound implications for the regulation of commercial speech.1 The
Second Circuit based its decision in substantial part on the U.S. Supreme
Court’s invalidation of a Vermont statute banning the sale of prescriberidentifying information without the physician’s consent in Sorrell v. IMF
Health, Inc.2 The Second Circuit’s reasoning has the potential to undermine the constitutionality of numerous areas of federal regulation,3 including regulation of the offer and sale of securities under the Securities
Act of 1933; the solicitation of shareholder proxies and periodic reporting under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; mandatory labels on
food,4 tobacco,5 and pesticides; and a wide range of privacy protections.6
As Justice Breyer warned in his dissent in Sorrell, this undue expansion
of the Free Speech rights of commercial actors, if left unchecked, threatens a return to the anti-regulatory fervor of the Lochner era.7 In particu1

U.S. v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012).
131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
3 See Jennifer L. Pomeranz, No Need to Break New Ground: A Response to the Supreme
Court’s Threat to Overhaul the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 389,
405–06 & n.89 (2012).
4 Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 § 2, 21 U.S.C. § 343(q) (2006); Food
Allergen Labeling and Consumer Protection Act of 2004 § 203, 21 U.S.C. § 343(w).
5 See, e.g., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(striking down requirement of graphic warning labels on cigarette packages).
6 David Orentlicher, The Commercial Speech Doctrine in Health Regulation: The Clash
Between the Public Interest in a Robust First Amendment and the Public Interest in Effective
Protection from Harm, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 299, 311 (2011). These include laws protecting
medical information, video rental records, and certain consumer credit card information.
7 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2675 (“To apply a ‘heightened’ standard of review in such cases
as a matter of course would risk what then-Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Central Hudson,
described as a ‘retur[n] to the bygone era of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), in
which it was common practice for this Court to strike down economic regulations adopted by a
2

R

R
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lar, mandating a laissez-faire “marketplace” of commercial promotions
as if that were the natural order bears an uncanny resemblance to Lochner’s invalidation of a statute that interfered with employers’ right to
contract with workers on whatever terms the labor market would bear.8
But it is possible to prohibit discriminatory restraints on commercial
speech while preserving the federal government’s power to regulate the
activities of specific actors in commerce to protect health and safety pursuant to a fair reading of the police power. Indeed, even though the FDA
chose not to appeal the Second Circuit’s ruling in Caronia, the issue of
commercial speech is sure to come before the Supreme Court in the nottoo-distant future. For example, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia Circuit noted in May 2013 in Association of Manufacturers v.
SEC the split in the circuits as to whether certain types of commercial
speech should be judged under intermediate or strict scrutiny.9 A careful
look at United States v. Caronia,10 then, not only provides guidance for
State based on the Court’s own notions of the most appropriate means for the State to implement its considered policies.’”) (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 589 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
8 See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 874 (1987) (arguing
that the Lochner Court erroneously believed that “[m]arket ordering under the common law
was . . . part of nature rather than a legal construct . . . .”). For a contrary view, see David E.
Bernstein, Lochner’s Legacy’s Legacy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2003).
9 No. 13–cv–635, 2013 WL 3803918, at *28 (D.D.C. July 23, 2013) (“While some
circuits apply strict scrutiny once the case is found to fall outside of the Zauderer [v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985)] standard, our Circuit
has rejected this dichotomous approach, holding instead that in evaluating the constitutionality
of compelled commercial speech, any ‘burdens imposed . . . receive a lower level of scrutiny
from courts.’” (quoting Philip Morris v. FDA, 566 F.3d 1205, 1142–43)). Under the Zauderer
standard, “‘purely factual and uncontroversial’ disclosures are permissible if they are ‘reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers,’ provided the requirements are not ‘unjustified or unduly burdensome.’” R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696
F.3d 1205, 1212 (D.C.Cir. 2012) (internal quotations omitted). Compare Disc. Tobacco City
& Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 554 (6th Cir. 2012) (“If a commercial-speech
disclosure requirement fits within the framework of Zauderer and its progeny, then we apply a
rational-basis standard. If it does not, then we . . . apply strict scrutiny.”) with R.J. Reynolds,
696 F.3d at 1212, 1215 (government must establish that the disclosures “directly and materially advance[ ]” a “substantial” government interest (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566)
unless “the government shows that, absent a warning, there is a self-evident—or at least ‘potentially real’—danger that an advertisement will mislead consumers.”). Because the conflict
minerals disclosures mandated by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376, and the Securities and Exchange Commission
regulation Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed.Reg. 56,274 (Sept. 12, 2012) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
§§ 240, 249b), at issue in Manufacturers Assoc. v. SEC, “are not aimed at preventing misleading or deceptive speech,” they were subject to intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson—
”a concession that, under this [D.C.] Circuit’s precedent, removes this case from the Zauderer
framework.” Id. at 1214. After evaluating both Dodd-Frank’s and the SEC’s requirements for
the mandatory public disclosure of whether certain minerals used in the production of publicly
traded firms’ products are Republic of the Congo “conflict-free,” the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia concluded that the required disclosures satisfied the test of intermediate scrutiny.
10 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012).
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future challenges to the commercial speech doctrine, but also provides
the opportunity to articulate a new standard for evaluating speech in regulated industries.11
We argue that as long as the government has a rational basis for
subjecting a particular industry to limits on commercial speech pursuant
to an “ordinary economic regulatory program[ ]”12 intended to further a
legitimate public interest rather than unfounded paternalism, and does
not discriminate against “disfavored” industry participants, those limits
should be subject to intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.13 This would enable the
Court to confine the heightened scrutiny applied in Sorrell to those cases
in which the government has played favorites among market participants
or sought to promote pure paternalism. We believe that our proposed
standard would close the “Pandora’s Box of First Amendment challenges”14 to commercial regulations opened by Sorrell as long as “the
government seeks typical regulatory ends” with “speech-related consequences [that] are indirect, incidental, and entirely commercial” and
thereby eliminate the risk of “reawaken[ing] Lochner’s pre-New Deal
threat of substituting judicial for democratic decisionmaking where ordinary economic regulation is at issue.”15
In Part I we discuss the development of the commercial speech doctrine and its erosion in the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Sorrell.
We then analyze the Second Circuit’s decision in Caronia and argue that
it improperly extended Sorrell to ban virtually any restriction on off-label
promotions. In Part II we articulate a theoretical justification for regulating truthful commercial speech based on the public interest and suggest a
new standard drawing on a key lesson from Sorrell and the analogous
case of Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n—that the government
may not favor certain industry participants over others. In Part III, we
then discuss the FDA’s 2011 Guidance for Industry: Responding to Unsolicited Requests for Off-Label Information About Prescription Drugs
and Medical Devices draft16 and analyze it under our proposed standard.
11 This could apply not only to the traditional area of food and drug safety but also to
more controversial topics, such as regulating fast food ads directed to children, restrictions on
alcohol commercials when children are likely to be watching TV, or bans on tobacco-company
sponsorships of televised sporting events.
12 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2675 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
13 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
14 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2685 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
15 Id. at 2685.
16 CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERV., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: RESPONDING TO UNSOLICITED REQUESTS FOR OFFLABEL INFORMATION ABOUT PRESCRIPTION DRUGS AND MEDICAL DEVICES (2011) [hereinafter
2011 DRAFT GUIDANCE], available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceCompli
anceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM285145.pdf.
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We draw on certain analogous provisions in the securities laws to guide
the development of a more narrowly tailored approach that balances the
need for dissemination of truthful and nonmisleading information about
off-label uses of prescription drugs with the need to prevent the widespread sale of potentially dangerous drugs without adequate testing and
labeling.
I. SORRELL

AND

CARONIA: THE EROSION
SPEECH DOCTRINE

OF THE

COMMERCIAL

A. Commercial Speech and the First Amendment: From Valentine v.
Chrestensen to Central Hudson
Prior to the 1970s, commercial speech enjoyed no protection under
the First Amendment.17 The first case to specifically address the question of constitutional protection for advertising was Valentine v.
Chrestensen.18 F.J. Chrestensen, the owner of a decommissioned U.S.
Navy submarine, distributed printed handbills in New York City advertising exhibitions of the submarine for profit.19 The New York City Police Department prohibited further distribution of the handbills, claiming
that it violated the City Sanitary Code, which “forbids distribution in the
streets of commercial and business advertising matter” but not “handbills
solely devoted to ‘information or a public protest.’”20 When Chrestensen then printed a double-faced handbill with a political protest on one
side and the advertisement on the other, the police told him that the twosided handbill was prohibited as well.21 The Court upheld the prohibition stating summarily that “the Constitution imposes no such restraint
on government as respects purely commercial advertising.”22
Thus began a period during which there seemed to be few limitations on the state’s ability to restrict commercial advertising. In Breard
v. City of Alexandria,23 for example, the Court refused to strike down an
17 2 SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 20:1 (2011) (“For many years commercial speech was regarded as outside the protection of the Constitution.”).
18 316 U.S. 52 (1942). Some, however, point to Justice Roberts’ dicta in Schneider v.
State as the forerunner of the commercial speech doctrine: “We are not to be taken as holding
that commercial soliciting and canvassing may not be subjected to such regulation as the ordinance requires.” 308 U.S. 147, 165 (1939); see, e.g., Lawrence Alexander, Speech in the
Local Marketplace: Implications of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc. for Local Regulatory Power, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 357 (1977); Alex
Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-History of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX.
L. REV. 747, 771–72 (1993).
19 316 U.S. at 53.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 53.
22 Id. at 54.
23 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
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ordinance prohibiting door-to-door advertising of commercial products.24
Writing for the majority, Justice Reed emphasized that the First Amendment does not extend to commercial speech:
Only the press or oral advocates of ideas could urge this
[First Amendment] point. It was not open to the solicitors for gadgets or brushes. . . . We agree that the fact
that periodicals are sold does not put them beyond the
protection of the First Amendment. The selling, however, brings into the transaction a commercial feature.25
In the 1976 case of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council,26 the Supreme Court changed direction.
The case concerned a Virginia state law that barred the publication and
advertising of prescription drug prices.27 The ban hurt consumers, who
were often unaware that a particular drug could be found more cheaply at
a nearby pharmacy or in another city.28 The Court overruled Valentine v.
Chrestensen29 and held that the statute violated the First Amendment.
The Court condemned Virginia’s “highly paternalistic approach” towards
truthful information,30 reasoning that “information is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well
enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication rather than to close them.”31
The Court highlighted the importance of the free flow of information to facilitate efficient economic transactions:
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling what product,
for what reason, and at what price. So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure will be made
through numerous private economic decisions. It is a
matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end,
the free flow of commercial information is
indispensable.32
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

Id. at 625.
Id. at 641–42.
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
Id. at 749–50.
Id. at 754.
Id. at 762.
Id. at 772.
Id. at 770.
Id. at 765 (citations omitted).
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Virginia State Board of Pharmacy extended constitutional protection for commercial speech under an anti-paternalism, pro-free market of
ideas theory. But the Court did not articulate a doctrinal standard for
evaluating the constitutionality of commercial speech until its decision in
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission33 in
1980.
Central Hudson involved an order by the New York Public Service
Commission requiring electric utilities to cease promotional advertising
that encouraged the use of electricity because of a shortage of fuel in the
1973–74 winter.34 Central Hudson challenged the prohibition under the
First Amendment, but the New York Court of Appeals upheld it, ruling
that advertising in the “noncompetitive market in which electric corporations operate” had little economic benefit.35
The Supreme Court reversed in an 8–1 decision. Although the
Court reiterated that commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment,36 it explained that commercial speech is entitled to “lesser protection”37 than the political speech at the heart of the First Amendment.
Instead of subjecting commercial speech to strict scrutiny, the Court
adopted a four-part intermediate scrutiny test: (1) to be protected, the
speech must concern a lawful activity, (2) the governmental restriction
must serve a substantial interest, (3) the regulation must directly advance
this interest, and (4) the regulatory scheme must be no more extensive
than necessary to achieve this substantial interest.38 Although the Court
found that the advertising concerned lawful activity and the governmental regulation directly sought to advance the substantial interest of energy
conservation and the fairness and efficiency of utility rates,39 the Court
ruled that the prohibition failed the final requirement of being non-excessive: “the energy conservation rationale . . . cannot justify suppressing
information about electric devices or services that would cause no net
increase in total energy use . . . no showing has been made that a more
limited restriction on the content of promotional advertising would not

33

447 U.S. 557 (1980).
Id. at 558–59.
35 Id. at 561 (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 390 N.E.2d 749, 757
(N.Y. 1979)).
36 Id.
37 Id. at 563.
38 Id. at 563–64. See also National Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, No. 13–cv–635, 2013 WL
3803918, at *30 (D.D.C. Jul. 23, 2013) (“[I]t is well established that “‘the least restrictive
means’ is not the standard; instead, the case law requires a reasonable ‘fit between the legislature’s ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends.’”).
39 Id. at 568–69.
34
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serve adequately the State’s interests.”40 Accordingly, the Court held
that the order was unconstitutional.41
B. Chipping Away at Intermediate Scrutiny
Even after Central Hudson, it was unclear whether the state may
“keep citizens in the dark” by “completely suppress[ing] the dissemination of concededly truthful information about entirely lawful activity.”42
The Court upheld outright prohibitions on truthful speech in Posadas de
Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico,43 concluding that
if the government has the power to prohibit an activity (in this case,
gambling), then it has the power to prohibit advertising of that activity.
Similarly, in the 1993 case United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.,44 the
Court refused to strike down a federal statute prohibiting broadcasters
from advertising lotteries other than those operated by the state that licensed the station.45 Despite the absence of any false or misleading content, the Court held that “this congressional policy of balancing the
interests of lottery and nonlottery States” qualified as a “substantial government interest that satisfies Central Hudson.”46
The Court dramatically changed course a mere three years later
when it struck down a Rhode Island ban on advertising liquor prices in
44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island.47 The plurality opinion penned by Justice Stevens condemned the “State’s paternalistic assumption that the
public will use truthful, nonmisleading commercial information
unwisely.”48
In a similar vein, in Thompson v. Western States Medical Center,
the Court struck down a prohibition on manufacturers’ soliciting and advertising compounded pharmaceutical drugs under the Central Hudson
framework.49 Compounding is a technique of combining existing drugs
to more suitably tailor the treatment to the needs of individual patients.
The Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 permits
compounding without FDA preapproval provided that a number of requirements are met, including that the prescription is “unsolicited” and—
most critically—that the pharmacist “not advertise or promote the com40
41
42

Id. at 570.
Id. at 572.
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 773

(1976).
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

478 U.S. 328 (1986).
509 U.S. 418 (1993).
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1304, 1307 (2006).
Edge Broadcasting, 509 U.S. at 428.
517 U.S. 484 (1996).
Id. at 487.
535 U.S. 357 (2002).
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pounding of any particular drug, class of drug, or type of drug.”50 The
Court recognized that “[p]reserving the effectiveness and integrity of the
FDCA’s new drug approval process is clearly an important governmental
interest, and the Government has every reason to want as many drugs as
possible to be subject to that approval process.”51 Nonetheless, it held
that the government had failed to articulate a sufficient justification for
the broad prohibition on advertising, rejecting the paternalistic notion
that “people would make bad decisions if given truthful information
about compounded drugs.”52 The Court also identified several less restrictive alternatives available to Congress, including prohibiting the use
of commercial-scale manufacturing or testing equipment for compounding, prohibiting compounding in advance of anticipated prescriptions, banning the sale of compounded drugs at wholesale prices, limiting
out-of-state sales or capping overall sales of compounded drugs.53
In Educational Media Co. v. Swecker, the Fourth Circuit upheld a
prohibition on alcohol advertisements in two college newspapers.54 With
respect to the third and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test, the
court deferentially concluded that the “link between [the advertising prohibition] and decreasing demand for alcohol by college students” is “amply supported by the record.”55 Moreover, the court emphasized, it “only
prohibits certain types of alcohol advertisements,” “allows restaurants to
inform readers about the presence and type of alcohol they serve,” “only
applies to college student publications—campus publications targeted at
students under twenty-one,” and “does not, on its face, affect all possible
student publications on campus.”56
The key distinction between Swecker and the seemingly contradictory line of reasoning in 44 Liquormart and Western States Medical is
that the advertising prohibition sought to reduce “the serious problem of
underage drinking and abusive drinking by college students,” which the
Swecker court found to be a substantial government interest.57 This interest is one of public safety and health, rather than a mere paternalistic
restriction on individual decision-making by consumers legally permitted
to buy a product. Abusive drinking affects society as a whole, not just a
single individual, and we suggest this difference is not only descriptively
relevant to distinguishing between outcomes in Swecker, 44 Liquormart,
and Western States Medical, but is also normatively valuable in con50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

21 U.S.C. § 353a(c) (2006).
Thompson, 535 U.S. at 369.
Id. at 386.
Id. at 372.
Educational Media Co. v. Swecker, 602 F.3d 583 (4th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 590.
Id. at 590–91.
Id. at 589.
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structing a theory of the proper bounds of limits on commercial speech.
It is worth keeping this animating distinction in mind in the following
discussion of Sorrell and our critique of Caronia in Section 0.
C. Sorrell v. IMS Health
It is apparent, then, that Sorrell v. IMS Health58 was decided against
the backdrop of increasing suspicion concerning paternalistic prevention
of the dissemination of truthful information. The case arose out of a
2007 law enacted by the Vermont state legislature that prohibited pharmaceutical manufacturers from using records of pharmacy prescriptions
for purposes of marketing to physicians.59 Prior to the 2007 law, pharmacies would sell physician-identifying prescribing information to companies engaged in “data mining,” which would then lease this
information to pharmaceutical manufacturers. The manufacturers would
use this information to more effectively target brand name drug marketing efforts to each doctor in light of his or her prescribing history.60
The legislative findings accompanying the statute emphasized that
“the goals of marketing programs are often in conflict with the goals of
the state” and the “marketplace for ideas on medicine safety and effectiveness is frequently one-sided in that brand-name companies invest in
expensive pharmaceutical marketing campaigns to doctors.”61 This
causes “doctors [to] prescribe[e] drugs based on incomplete and biased
information.”62 Even though the legislature made additional findings regarding the effect of such marketing, such as “increas[ing] the cost of
health care and health insurance,”63 the primary justification for the prohibition was the need to avoid a cognitive process that distorted physicians’ choice of brand-name drugs instead of the generic alternatives.64
These rationales evidenced a strong paternalistic motive.
Rejecting the need to protect physicians from themselves, the Sorrell Court emphasized the importance of the free flow of information,
quoting from its 1976 decision in Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
58

Sorrell v. IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
See An Act Relating to Increasing Transparency of Prescription Drug Pricing and
Information, 2007 Vt. Acts & Resolves 635, 650–53 (codified as amended at VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 4631 (2013)).
60 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2660.
61 2007 Vt. Acts & Resolves at 635.
62 Id.
63 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2661 (citing 2007 Vt. Acts & Resolves at 637). Although Vermont also defended the statute as necessary to protect the privacy of the prescribing physician,
that rationale was rejected because the prescriber-identifying information was made available
to the government and other “favored” listeners. Id. at 2668.
64 See id. at 2670 (“If prescriber-identifying information were available for use by detailers, the State contends, then detailing would be effective in promoting brand-name drugs that
are more expensive and less safe than generic alternatives.”).
59
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Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.: “The First Amendment directs us to be
especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for
what the government perceives to be their own good.”65 The Court
pointed out that “[t]hese precepts apply with full force when the audience, in this case prescribing physicians, consists of ‘sophisticated and
experienced’ consumers.”66 The Court also recognized that the First
Amendment protects not just the rights of listeners but also the rights of
speakers—here, the data miners and drug manufacturers.
We will have more to say on the theoretical issues surrounding the
free-market-of-information approach to regulating commercial speech in
Part II. But it is worth noting at this juncture that, while many areas of
existing regulation of truthful commercial speech—such as the regulation of offers of securities under the Securities Act of 1933—are geared
towards unsophisticated consumers, not all are. Indeed, if the Court’s
stated rationale in Sorrell were limited to sophisticated consumers, the
ambit of its decision might not be as far-reaching. But the Court went
much further, striking down the Vermont law because
[t]he State has imposed content- and speaker-based restrictions on the availability and use of prescriber-identifying information. So long as they do not engage in
marketing, many speakers can obtain and use the information. But detailers cannot. Vermont’s statute could
be compared with a law prohibiting trade magazines
from purchasing or using ink. Like that hypothetical
law, § 4631(d) imposes a speaker- and content-based
burden on protected expression, and that circumstance is
sufficient to justify application of heightened scrutiny.67
As we explain in Part II.D.2, we prefer to read this narrowly in light
of the legislature’s intentional discrimination against brand-name manufacturers in favor of their generic competitors. But a less charitable interpretation might conclude that the Court is imposing strict scrutiny
simply because the regulation at issue only applies to a certain group
within the population at large (a “speaker-based burden”) and only with
respect to certain types of dialogue (a “content-based burden”). As
others have noted,68 such a reading would represent a dramatic expan65

Id. at 2671 (quoting 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1508

(1996)).
66

Id. at 2671.
Id. at 2667 (citing Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460
U.S. 575 (1983)).
68 See, e.g., Isabelle Bibet-Kalinyak, A Critical Analysis of Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.:
Pandora’s Box at Best, 67 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 191 (2012); John N. Joseph et al., Is Sorrell the
Death Knell for FDA’s Off-Label Marketing Restrictions?, J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L., Feb.
67
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sion of First Amendment protection for commercial speech and the practical elimination of the Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny standard.
These implications were not lost on the three dissenting Justices. In
an opinion authored by Justice Breyer, the dissenting Justices cited Justice Holmes’s well-known dissent in Lochner v. New York and pointed
out:
[G]iven the sheer quantity of regulatory initiatives that
touch upon commercial messages, the Court’s vision of
its reviewing task threatens to return us to a happily bygone era when judges scrutinized legislation for its interference with economic liberty. History shows that the
power was much abused and resulted in the constitutionalization of economic theories preferred by individual
jurists. By inviting courts to scrutinize whether a State’s
legitimate regulatory interests can be achieved in less restrictive ways whenever they touch (even indirectly)
upon commercial speech, today’s majority risks repeating the mistakes of the past in a manner not anticipated
by our precedents.69
In short, the essence of Justice Breyer’s critique is that most forms of
substantive regulation have some effect on commercial speech. Any
transaction between two parties necessarily involves speech—restricting
the transaction is often impossible without restricting the speech.
Indeed, numerous areas of federal regulation restrict speech antecedent to or in parallel with economic transactions. For example, section
5(c) of the Securities Act of 1933 prohibits making an “offer to sell or
offer to buy . . . any security, unless a registration statement has been
filed as to such security.”70 As offers are plainly commercial speech,
subjecting the prohibition on making offers for unregistered securities to
strict scrutiny could lead to the conclusion that section 5(c) is unconstitutional.71 We discuss this and other concerning possibilities at length in
2012, at 1; Pomeranz, supra note 3; Richard Samp, Sorrell v. IMS Health: Protecting Free
Speech or Resurrecting Lochner?, 2010–2011 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 129, 130.
69 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2679 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45, 75–76 (1905)).
70 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2006).
71 Similarly, Section 17(b) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(b) (2006),
prohibits a person from receiving compensation from an issuer in exchange for writing about a
security unless the compensation is fully disclosed. As explained by Samp, supra note 68, at
142, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit subjected the limitations in Section 17(b)
to “limited First Amendment scrutiny,” reasoning: “In areas of extensive federal regulation—
like securities dealing—we do not believe that the Constitution requires the judiciary to weigh
the relative merits of particular regulatory objectives that impinge upon communications occurring within the umbrella of an overall regulatory scheme.” SEC v. Wall St. Publ’g Inst.,
851 F.2d 365, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

R
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Part II.A, but suffice it to say that an expansive reading of the Court’s
reasoning in Sorrell suggests the extinction of the commercial speech
doctrine. At the very least, Sorrell suggests that the intermediate scrutiny standard in Central Hudson may not be so intermediate after all.
D. United States v. Caronia: Prohibiting Truthful Marketing of OffLabel Use by Prescription Drug Manufacturers
1. Background and Context
The original Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 did not require preapproval of pharmaceutical drugs.72 The predominant paradigm was one of
ex post enforcement through litigation over false claims.73 But in 1911,
the Supreme Court held that the antifraud prohibition did not extend to
claims relating to the effect of a drug on a patient’s health but only factual descriptions such as the drug’s ingredients.74 Despite the enactment
of a subsequent statutory amendment in 1912 prohibiting fraud,75 the
standard of intentional misrepresentation proved too high a burden to
effectively reduce false claims in drug advertising.76 Yet it took another
twenty-six years, after more than one hundred people died from a poisonous “Elixir Sulfanilamide,” before Congress enacted the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) in 1938.77
The sulfanilamide fiasco led to the imposition of a requirement in
the FDCA for preapproval before a drug may be marketed,78 reflecting
the recognition that ex post litigation provided insufficient deterrence.
Section 505(a) of the FDCA states plainly, “No person shall introduce or
deliver for introduction into interstate commerce any new drug, unless an
approval of an application filed pursuant to subsection (b) or (j) of this
section is effective with respect to such drug.”79 The remainder of section 505 specifies detailed requirements for such an application and
prescribes the process by which approval of a new drug may be
granted.80
72 Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (repealed
1938). For a detailed overview of the history of the FDCA, see generally Wallace F. Janssen,
Outline of the History of U.S. Drug Regulation and Labeling, 36 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 420
(1981).
73 See Janssen, supra note 72, at 427.
74 United States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488 (1911).
75 Sherley Amendment, Pub. L. No. 62-301, 37 Stat. 416 (1912).
76 See Janssen, supra note 72, at 427–28.
77 Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938); Janssen, supra note 72, at 429.
78 Id. (“Drug manufacturers were required to provide scientific proof that new products
could be safely used before putting them on the market—the sulfanilamide experience had
started what is now the major system of U. S. drug regulation.”).
79 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2006).
80 See id. § 355(b)–(w).

R

R
R
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Two essential aspects of this approval process are the requirements
that a new drug be “safe for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling thereof” and that it may
“responsibly be concluded . . . that the drug will have the effect it purports or is represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed,
recommended, or suggested in the labeling or proposed labeling
thereof.”81 Accordingly, marketing a drug for a use other than that
which appears on the proposed labeling would seem to raise concerns
regarding safety and efficacy.82 The FDCA, however, does not expressly
prohibit marketing a drug for “off-label” uses. Rather, it prohibits “misbranding,” which is defined as “[t]he introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate commerce of any . . . drug . . . that is . . .
misbranded.”83 This circular language ultimately turns on the definition
of “misbranded,” which the statute defines to include labeling that lacks
“adequate directions for use.”84 The statutory definition makes no reference to marketing, promotion, or even approved uses.
The FDA, however, enacted regulations that go beyond simple mislabeling. They define “adequate directions for use” to include “directions under which the layman can use a drug safely and for the purposes
for which it is intended.”85 “Intended use” is further defined as
the objective intent of the persons legally responsible for
the labeling of drugs. The intent is determined by such
persons’ expressions or may be shown by the circumstances surrounding the distribution of the article. This
objective intent may, for example, be shown by labeling
claims, advertising matter, or oral or written statements
by such persons or their representatives. It may be
shown by the circumstances that the article is, with the
knowledge of such persons or their representatives, offered and used for a purpose for which it is neither labeled nor advertised.86
Accordingly, under these FDA regulations, the government may establish misbranding by showing that the drug’s labeling diverges from the
“intended use” by its manufacturer, which may be shown by statements
made by its representatives. Misbranding is a crime punishable by up to
81

Id. § 355(d).
That said, questions regarding the safety of a drug are less important for new indications than those of effectiveness. Most off-label use is tangential to an existing approved use
and thus has an applicable and often robust safety profile. Furthermore, the industry is often
seeking to promote off-label use through the dissemination of clinical studies.
83 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (2006).
84 Id. § 352(f).
85 21 C.F.R. § 201.5 (2013).
86 Id. § 201.128 (emphasis added).
82
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three years in prison or $10,000 in fines per occurrence,87 which can
accumulate to millions or even billions of dollars. It is essential to observe that this convoluted statutory and regulatory scheme means that
misbranding is a crime that applies to manufacturers and their representatives only—any other party may freely discuss and even promote a drug
for unapproved uses because they do not fall within the ambit of the
labeling statute.
Indeed, the Department of Justice has recently pursued misbranding
cases that have led to multi-billion dollar judgments. In July 2012, GlaxoSmithKline LLC pled guilty and agreed to pay $3 billion in fines and
forfeitures over charges of misbranding the drugs Paxil, Wellbutrin, and
Avandia.88 In May 2012, Abbott Laboratories pled guilty and agreed to
pay $1.6 billion to settle charges that it had illegally marketed
Depakote.89 In 2010, Pfizer similarly paid $2.3 billion to resolve charges
of misbranding Bextra and illegally promoting Geodon, Zyvox, and
Lyrica.90 In all of these cases, a primary theory of liability was marketing for an unapproved use, not necessarily that the advertised use was
false or misleading.91
As several commentators have noted, Sorrell v. IMS Health reflects
a substantial weakening of the commercial speech doctrine set out in
Central Hudson, which calls into question the constitutionality of the
87

21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(2).
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, GlaxoSmithKline to Plead Guilty and Pay $3
Billion to Resolve Fraud Allegations and Failure to Report Safety Data: Largest Health Care
Fraud Settlement in U.S. History (Jul. 2, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
2012/July/12-civ-842.html.
89 Terry Frieden & Tom Watkins, Abbott Laboratories to Pay $1.6 Billion Over Misbranding Drug, CNN.COM, http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/07/justice/abbott-fine-drug (May 7,
2012, 6:29 PM).
90 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Announces Largest Health
Care Fraud Settlement in Its History (Sep. 2, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/
pr/2009/September/09-civ-900.html.
91 Affirming a conviction for medical device sales without FDA approval, the Second
Circuit acknowledged the classic objection to commercial speech regulation in this context:
[I]f a given use is lawful, and thus can be written about freely in newspapers or
blogs, and discussed among hospitals . . . doesn’t it make a good deal of sense to
allow speech by the manufacturer, which after all will have the best information?
Why privilege speech by the uninformed?
United States v. Caputo, 517 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir. 2008). But the court rejected this argument, concluding that “if a manufacturer’s promise to the FDA to avoid speech about off-label
uses is unenforceable, the FDA may respond by withholding any approval of drugs or devices
that have questionable additional uses.” Id.; see also Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F.
Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 1998), appeal dismissed sub nom. Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202
F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Some have advocated that off-label use should constitute the standard of care in a medical malpractice action because it reflects “the safest, most effective,
state-of-the-art treatment.” Mark Herrmann & Pearson Bownas, Keeping the Label Out of the
Case, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 477, 486 (2009).
88
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FDA’s regulation of off-label marketing.92 In United States v.
Caronia,93 the Second Circuit took the erosion of the intermediate scrutiny standard for commercial speech to a new level. The facts of
Caronia are straightforward. Alfred Caronia was a sales representative
for Orphan Medical, Inc., manufacturer of Xyrem, a drug approved by
the FDA to treat narcolepsy.94 Along with co-defendant Dr. Peter
Gleason,95 Caronia marketed Xyrem to doctors at various events and
one-on-one meetings.96 In one such meeting, Caronia was secretly recorded promoting Xyrem for uses not approved by the FDA such as
chronic pain, fatigue, and fibromyalgia.97 Caronia was charged with promoting an unapproved use of a pharmaceutical drug in violation of the
FDCA, a federal crime through a convoluted interaction of statutory language and FDA rulemaking.
The appeal in Caronia was limited to the question of whether these
regulations are constitutional under the First Amendment. The constitutional question arises from the selective nature of the prohibition on promoting off-label uses: again, only manufacturers and their
representatives are subject to the restriction under this unique statutory
and regulatory scheme. Congress and the FDA could have prohibited
off-label promotion entirely, but they did not, likely for political reasons,
as others have suggested.98 Moreover, the prohibition on off-label marketing is not restricted to false or misleading statements, which would be
independently actionable under the existing law of fraud. This is simply
an outright ban on promoting the off-label uses of a drug that applies
solely to manufacturers and their representatives.
In a 2–1 opinion, the Second Circuit vacated Caronia’s conviction,
holding that prosecution solely for promoting off-label uses violated the
First Amendment.99 In its appeal, the government attempted to argue it
92 See, e.g., Joseph, supra note 68; Kate Maternowski, Note, The Commercial Speech
Doctrine Barely Survives Sorrell, 38 J.C. & U.L. 629 (2012); Samp, supra note 68, at 130
(“Several justices have expressed a willingness to eliminate the doctrinal distinctions between
commercial speech and other forms of speech[ ] . . . [but] the Court’s majority is not yet
willing to take that step.”).
93 U.S. v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012).
94 Id. at 155.
95 Dr. Gleason and Orphan Medical pled guilty to charges of misbranding under the
FDCA. Id. at 158.
96 Id. at 156.
97 Id.
98 See, e.g., Coleen Klasmeier & Martin H. Redish, Off-Label Prescription Advertising,
the FDA and the First Amendment: A Study in the Values of Commercial Speech Protection,
37 AM. J.L. & MED. 315, 323 (2011) (“What began as an effort to control off-label prescribing
by physicians thus shifted to the use of a federal statute to constrain manufacturer speech about
such prescribing—purely, it would seem, because physicians so vociferously objected to any
insinuation by the FDA into decisions relating to the circumstances in which lawfully marketed drugs would be used.”).
99 U.S. v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 160 (2d Cir. 2012).
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was not prosecuting Caronia for the speech per se but rather was using
the off-label marketing solely as proof of intent to distribute misbranded
drugs, in line with the text of the FDA regulation.100 The court, however, rejected that argument, emphasizing that the trial record “confirms
overwhelmingly that Caronia was, in fact, prosecuted and convicted for
promoting Xyrem off-label.”101 Moreover, the court emphasized, “[t]he
government never argued in summation or rebuttal that the promotion
was evidence of intent,” and indeed:
[T]he government never suggested that Caronia engaged
in any form of misbranding other than the promotion of
the off-label use of an FDA-approved drug. The government never suggested, for example, that Caronia conspired to place false or deficient labeling on a drug.
Rather, the record makes clear that the government prosecuted Caronia for his promotion and marketing
efforts.102
Accordingly, the Second Circuit analyzed the constitutionality of
Caronia’s prosecution under the theory that the off-label marketing alone
constituted a violation of the FDCA.
The majority based its holding on two seemingly independent theories: first, that the FDA regulations are content-based and speaker-based
restrictions on speech, thus justifying strict scrutiny under Sorrell; and
second, that the FDA regulations fail even the more lenient test of intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson. As we explain, however, it is
doubtful that the court’s application of these tests are truly independent.
Indeed, the approach taken by the majority has profound implications.
2. Analogy to Sorrell and Strict Scrutiny
In its first justification for finding Caronia’s prosecution unconstitutional, the majority heavily relied on Sorrell, identifying two fatal flaws
in the FDA’s prohibition of off-label marketing: (a) the prohibition only
applies to speech with specific content; and (b) it applies solely to pharmaceutical manufacturers.103 The majority analogized both of these to
the data mining law in Sorrell that was found unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court. As in Sorrell, the majority suggested, the FDA is seeking to restrict a specific type of speech—marketing off-label drug uses—
while the underlying conduct remains entirely legal.104 Moreover, like
100

Id. at 160–61.
Id.
102 Id. (citations omitted).
103 Id. at 165.
104 Id. (“Indeed, the content of the regulated speech drives this construction of the FDCA;
as in Sorrell, the ‘express purpose and practical effect’ of the government’s ban on promotion
101
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Sorrell, this restraint “targets one kind of speaker—pharmaceutical manufacturers—while allowing others to speak without restriction.”105 It is a
straightforward application of the Supreme Court’s holding in Sorrell,
the majority concluded, to subject the FDA’s content-based and speakerbased prohibition on commercial speech to strict scrutiny. Indeed, the
criminal charges against Caronia justify “more careful scrutiny” than the
one applied in Sorrell, which concerned civil liability.106
A more careful look at the two cases, however, suggests that this
analogy is less straightforward than the majority suggests. The Supreme
Court emphasized that the law in Sorrell had the “express purpose and
practical effect” of “diminish[ing] the effectiveness of marketing by
manufacturers of brand-name drugs.”107 In other words, the regulation
did not merely target a specific segment of the public but actively discriminated between brand-name and generic manufacturers; the court
thus noted: “it appears that Vermont could supply academic organizations with prescriber-identifying information to use in countering the
messages of brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers and in promoting
the prescription of generic drugs.”108 Indeed, as we explain more fully
below, there is a key distinction between restricting the scope of regulation to its functionally justified target—i.e., the segment of society that
must be brought within its scope for the regulation to function effectively—and discriminating between parties in an arbitrary and unfair
manner, i.e., to the benefit of one and detriment of another.109
Indeed, this concern of arbitrarily favoring one industry participant
or type of good over another seemed to animate the Court’s decision in
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, where it struck down a prohibition on the sale of violent video games to minors.110 While Brown was
a core speech case, the Court emphasized the analogous point that “California has singled out the purveyors of video games for disfavored treatment—at least when compared to booksellers, cartoonists, and movie
producers—and has given no persuasive reason why.”111 In our view, as
a descriptive matter this fundamental consideration moves the Court.
is to ‘diminish the effectiveness of [off-label drug] marketing by manufacturers.”) (quoting
Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2663 (2011)).
105 Id.
106 Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 333(a) (2006); Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct.
2705, 2724 (2010)).
107 Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2663 (2011) (emphasis added).
108 Id.
109 Indeed, an additional unique aspect of Sorrell was that federal and state governments
are large purchasers of pharmaceutical drugs as well. Government is acting both as a buyer
and regulator when it prohibits data mining, and thus seems to have an inherent conflict of
interest in favoring generics.
110 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2740–42 (2011).
111 Id. at 2740.
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Moreover, as we explain in Part III, we suggest that the principle of not
favoring one industry participant over another should constitute a foundational principle of a comprehensive revision of the FDA’s approach to
regulating off-label marketing.112
Similarly, the D.C. Circuit in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA
recently struck down the FDA’s mandatory graphic labeling for cigarette
packaging under Central Hudson.113 The court formally decided the
case by finding that the FDA failed to provide any evidence that the
graphic warnings would “directly advance” the FDA’s interest in reducing smoking,114 but its presentation of the question is telling: “how much
leeway should this Court grant the government when it seeks to compel a
product’s manufacturer to convey the state’s subjective—and perhaps
even ideological—view that consumers should reject this otherwise legal, but disfavored, product.”115 It seems that the court was particularly
disturbed by the discrimination among equally legal products in an industry. This view is consistent with our proposal to subject restrictions
on truthful commercial speech to more deferential intermediate scrutiny
under Central Hudson as long as the truthful commercial speech does not
favor one industry participant over another.
The Caronia majority’s content-based argument is even more suspect. In Sorrell, the Court emphasized the legislature’s “expressed statement of purpose” to “target those speakers and their messages for
disfavored treatment,” i.e., “messages that ‘are often in conflict with the
goals of the state.’”116 This was the content-based restriction the Court
found to justify strict scrutiny—an explicit legislative intent to prohibit
messages that contradicted its ex ante goals for ideal public discourse on
the advantages and disadvantages of various pharmaceuticals. There was
no such intent in the development of the FDA’s off-label marketing regu112 Indeed, our approach can guide the resolution of a recent split between the Second and
Sixth Circuits over the applicable standard of review when regulating truthful commercial
speech. In Discount Tobacco City & Lottery v. United States, the Sixth Circuit held that strict
scrutiny applies to such restrictions. Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States,
674 F.3d 509, 554 (6th Cir. 2012) (“If a commercial-speech disclosure requirement fits within
the framework of Zauderer and its progeny, then we apply a rational-basis standard. If it does
not, then we . . . apply strict scrutiny.”) (citations omitted). The U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia expressly disagreed with this position in National Association of Manufacturers v. SEC, emphasizing the contrary precedent of the D.C. Circuit. National Ass’n of
Mfrs. v. SEC, No. 13–cv–635, 2013 WL 3803918, at *28 (D.D.C. Jul. 23, 2013) (“While some
circuits apply strict scrutiny once the case is found to fall outside of the Zauderer standard, our
Circuit has rejected this dichotomous approach, holding instead that in evaluating the constitutionality of compelled commercial speech, any ‘burdens imposed . . . receive a lower level of
scrutiny from courts.’”) (citations omitted).
113 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
114 Id. at 1219.
115 Id. at 1212 (emphasis added).
116 Id. (quoting 2007 Vt. Acts & Resolves 635).
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lations, which sought to promote public health by preventing the needless purchase of ineffective drugs and exposure of patients to
unnecessary potential safety risks.117 Controlling unduly paternalistic
opinion restrictions on commercial speech is fundamentally different
from preventing misallocation of resources and protecting patient health.
The FDA was not seeking to silence contrary opinion but rather to
discourage the use of drugs in ways that are potentially ineffective or
unsafe. If anything, the FDA’s regulation was arguably content-neutral—it did not prohibit the content of marketing messages, e.g., specific
words or phrases. Rather, it sought to ensure that, regardless of the precise marketing message, manufacturers’ inherent interest in selling their
products would not unnecessarily endanger patients’ health. The requirement of obtaining FDA approval for specific uses before the products
may be legally marketed can be understood as a prophylactic means of
achieving this goal. Now, this restriction currently sweeps too far in our
view—but that does not imply that the FDA intended to suppress a certain viewpoint, as the Vermont legislature did in Sorrell. Accordingly,
Sorrell does not seem to justify the application of strict scrutiny in
Caronia.
Moreover, as Richard Samp, Chief Counsel of the Washington Legal Foundation, points out,118 the Sorrell Court acknowledged that limits
on commercial speech might be warranted to protect against fraud,119 to
suppress false commercial speech or commercial speech that proposes an
illegal transaction,120 or to protect privacy.121 As we explained above,
the FDA does not ban the discussion of off-label uses per se. It bans the
promotion of misbranded drugs, which do not bear adequate warnings.
Because it is illegal to sell misbranded drugs, such promotions might be
viewed as proposing an illegal transaction.
Indeed, the First Amendment doctrine with respect to noncommercial speech takes a deferential approach to content-neutrality, i.e., time,
place, or manner, restrictions. In Ward v. Rock Against Racism, the
Court upheld a New York City ordinance that required use of a sound
technician and amplification equipment approved by the City in order to
117

See Klasmeier & Redish, supra note 98, at 320–21.
Samp, supra note 68, at 138.
119 Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2672 (2011) (“The Court has noted, for
example, that ‘a State may choose to regulate price advertising in one industry but not in
others, because the risk of fraud . . . is in its view greater there.’” (quoting R.A.V. v. St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 388–89 (1992))).
120 Id. at 2664 (reasoning that bans on false commercial speech and a ban on commercial
speech that proposes an illegal transaction are “restrictions directed at commerce or conduct”
that impose only “incidental burdens on speech”).
121 Id. at 2668 (noting that the medical record privacy provisions in the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2, “would present quite a different case”).
118
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prevent excessive music volume at outdoor concerts.122 The Court emphasized that a content-neutral regulatory scheme “need not be the least
restrictive or least intrusive means” of accomplishing the governmental
interest.123 Similarly, the Court emphasized that the content-neutral test
applies whenever the government has not “adopted a regulation of
speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.”124 Here,
the FDA has plainly not adopted its restrictions in order to target a specific economic actor or a group of actors. The agency’s regulations limit
off-label promotion by brand-name and generic drug manufacturers
alike. Accordingly, by analogy to noncommercial speech, lower scrutiny
should apply to this content- and speaker-neutral restriction. Indeed,
reading Sorrell as broadly as the majority suggests would have profound
implications for the constitutionality of several federal regulatory regimes, as we discuss further below.
3. Central Hudson: Intermediate Scrutiny in Name Only?
The second justification given by the Caronia majority for vacating
Caronia’s conviction was that the FDA regulation failed the traditional
four-prong intermediate scrutiny test of Central Hudson for the constitutionality of a restriction on commercial speech.125 As explained above,
under Central Hudson as long as the commercial speech (1) concerns
lawful activity and is not false or misleading, a prohibition will be upheld
only if it advances (2) a substantial government interest, (3) directly advances that interest, and is (4) “not more extensive than is necessary to
serve that interest.”126 While the Caronia majority found that the first
two elements of the Central Hudson test were satisfied, it held that the
third and fourth were not.
With respect to the third element, the majority concluded:
As off-label drug use itself is not prohibited, it does not
follow that prohibiting the truthful promotion of off-label drug usage by a particular class of speakers would
directly further the government’s goals of preserving the
efficacy and integrity of the FDA’s drug approval process and reducing patient exposure to unsafe and ineffective drugs.127
122
123
124
125

491 U.S. 781, 803 (1989).
Id. at 798.
Id. at 791.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566, 571–72

(1980).
126
127

Id. at 566.
United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 166 (2d Cir. 2012).
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Of course, this conclusory finding shows no deference to the agency’s
determination regarding the effect of off-label marketing or even an explanation why this does not “directly” further the goal of protecting patient safety. Reducing the marketing of off-label drug usage would seem
to have some corresponding effect on actual use. And since off-label
usage has not undergone FDA review for safety and effectiveness, it
seems reasonable to suppose that on average, unapproved uses of a drug
are less effective or more risky than approved uses. Accordingly, it does
not take particularly strong assumptions to reach the conclusion that reducing off-label marketing would tend, on average, to directly improve
allocative efficiency—the expenditure of resources on drugs that are
most effective—and patient safety. That is not to say that these are the
only relevant considerations, but the Caronia majority’s summary conclusion that there is no such direct effect seems unfounded. A failure to
prohibit the underlying activity—off-label usage—does not imply that
prohibiting off-label marketing would not achieve a similar end.
It is interesting to note that the majority follows this conclusory assertion with a citation to Sorrell and a parenthetical explanation: “holding government interest in protecting physician privacy not directly
served when law made prescriber-identifying information available to
‘all but a narrow class of disfavored speakers.’”128 This suggests that the
Caronia majority is actually applying the strict scrutiny analysis it employed previously, despite referring to Central Hudson and its “less rigorous intermediate test.”129 Indeed, one has to wonder if this is merely
intermediate scrutiny in name only. The court showed no deference to
the FDA’s view on the link between marketing and usage and, by citing
Sorrell yet again, the court seems to be fixated on the supposed speakerbased restriction. Interestingly, the bulk of its discussion of the third
prong focuses not on the distinction between “direct” and “indirect” furtherance of a governmental interest, but on the policy rationales weighing against the FDA’s regulation:
[P]rohibiting off-label promotion by a pharmaceutical
manufacturer while simultaneously allowing off-label
use “paternalistically” interferes with the ability of physicians and patients to receive potentially relevant treatment information; such barriers to information about offlabel use could inhibit, to the public’s detriment, informed and intelligent treatment decisions.130

128
129
130

Id. at 166.
Id. at 164.
Id. at 166.
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However, as we explain in Part II, the implications of applying strict
scrutiny to this type of regulation—even when semantically applying
Central Hudson—are wide-reaching and threaten to undermine entire
blocks of federal regulation, such as the Securities Act of 1933. The
theoretical and policy considerations implicated in this issue are complex
and require a fundamental discussion of First Amendment theory in the
context of commercial speech.
Similarly, the Caronia majority’s discussion of the fourth Central
Hudson prong consists of a summary conclusion that “the government’s
construction of the FDCA to impose a complete and criminal ban on offlabel promotion by pharmaceutical manufacturers is more extensive than
necessary to achieve the government’s substantial interests.”131 An analytic discussion of this fourth prong would begin by considering how
precisely this interest should be defined. Again, prohibiting off-label
marketing by manufacturers is highly likely to lead to a reduction in offlabel usage. If the governmental interest is promoting patient safety, it is
hard to conceive of anything more necessary to achieve that interest than
a reduction in off-label usage, however slight—and the marketing restriction is likely to have more than a slight effect. Indeed, the Supreme
Court has made it clear that
[t]he Government is not required to employ the least restrictive means conceivable, but it must demonstrate narrow tailoring of the challenged regulation to the asserted
interest—”a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the
interest served.”132
Indeed, there is a fundamental difference between an irrational prohibition and one that achieves a marginal effect.133 Conceptually, the notion
of “more extensive than necessary” implies that some aspect of the restriction is ineffective at achieving the result. If a marginal effect cannot
be narrowly tailored, then only regulation that succeeds at completely
eliminating the undesired phenomenon would pass. This is unrealistic
and again shows the majority’s application of a strict scrutiny standard
that seems impossible to meet. Part II discusses the policy implications
131

Id. at 167.
Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188
(1999) (quoting Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)).
133 Cf. WV Ass’n of Club Owners and Fraternal Servs., Inc. v. Musgrave, 553 F.3d 292,
304–05 (4th Cir. 2009) (“The Court has struck down restrictions in cases where the program is
irrational . . . or where there is specific evidence that goes against the claimed linkage.” (citing
Greater New Orleans Broadcasting, 527 U.S. at 190; 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517
U.S. 484, 506 & n.17 (1996); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 488 (1995); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771–73 (1993))).
132
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of such a fundamental limitation on the government’s capacity to restrain
commercial speech in light of the theory behind the First Amendment.
II. THE CHALLENGE

OF

REGULATING COMMERCIAL SPEECH

A. Public Interest v. Paternalism in Regulation of Commercial
Speech: Information Dissemination or Protecting Unwary
Consumers?
1. The Theory of Protecting Commercial Speech Under the First
Amendment
Despite appearing deceptively simple, numerous theoretical questions surrounding commercial speech—what precisely it is, whether it is
entitled to protection under the First Amendment, and what the extent of
such protection should be—are maddeningly complex. As Robert Post
noted in his famous essay in the UCLA Law Review, “[c]ommercial
speech differs from public discourse because it is constitutionally valued
merely for the information it disseminates, rather than for being itself a
valuable way of participating in democratic self-determination.”134 The
problem, of course, is that it is far from clear how much protection the
dissemination of information should receive. Post suggests that, as a
starting point, the First Amendment should apply “only when the stream
of information flows among strangers who can be conceived as independent and rational,” which implies that “information must be dispersed
under conditions that are constitutive of a public communicative
sphere.”135
This principle permits identifying those cases of “dependence or reliance” where commercial speech receives no First Amendment protection because it will be generally regarded as “‘“linked inextricably” with
the commercial arrangement in which it occurs,’ so that regulation of the
arrangement can also restrict the speech by which the arrangement is
constituted.”136 However, this categorization is less helpful for judging
the appropriateness of a government restraint of protected commercial
speech that is truthful, and particularly the degree of scrutiny courts
should impose. On this issue, Post suggests that the guiding theory
should be a distinction between truly paternalistic regulation and advancing the public interest:
In Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro,
for example, the government forbade “for sale” signs in
134 Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1,
4 (2000).
135 Id. at 24.
136 Id. at 24–25 (footnote omitted) (quoting Edenfield 507 U.S. at 767 (1993)) (quoting
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 n.9 (1979))).
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order to prevent the blockbusting of a racially integrated
neighborhood. The regulation had nothing to do with
the “good” of individual buyers or sellers, but was instead enacted to preserve the possibility of integrating
housing. The ordinance was not paternalistic . . . . It did
not regulate the behavior of individuals in order to protect them from themselves; it sought instead to achieve a
public good.137
While some scholars have suggested that paternalism historically played
little role in the Court’s adjudicatory process,138 it held great importance
in Sorrell139 and was explicitly emphasized by the Second Circuit in
Caronia.140 The fear of paternalism—and a corresponding commitment
to consumer autonomy—seems to underlie this most recent trend of decisions that are chipping away at the intermediate scrutiny standard.141
Scholars have penned a variety of responses to the concern that excessive paternalism undermines the liberty and autonomy of individual
citizens. For example, Robert Post takes the view that the normative
superiority of individual autonomy in the context of democracy and the
First Amendment is misplaced: “democracy is not about individual selfgovernment, but about collective self-determination,” which means that
“[u]nlike various forms of liberalism, democracy does not focus on the
protection of individual autonomy outside of participation within this
137 Id. at 51 (footnotes omitted) (citing Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431
U.S. 85, 87–91 (1997)).
138 E.g., Daniel Hays Lowenstein, “Too Much Puff”: Persuasion, Paternalism, and Commercial Speech, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1205, 1242 (1988) (“[I]n the absence of any cases involving truly paternalistic restrictions of the strong type, the Court ought to be taken at its antipaternalistic word.”).
139 Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2670–72 (2011) (“[T]he ‘fear that [consumers] would make bad decisions if given truthful information’ cannot justify content-based
burdens on speech.” (quoting Thompson v. Western States Medical Ctr, 535 U.S. 357, 374
(2002) and citing Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 769–70 (1976))). The Second Circuit cited this statement in Caronia. United
States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 166, 181 (2d Cir. 2012).
140 Caronia, 703 F.3d at 166.
141 In our view, the ideological opposition to paternalism is the more compelling explanation for the recent case law rather than a genuine belief in the natural efficiency of a market of
free information in the commercial sphere. The notion that consumers make better-informed
decisions, as an empirical matter, when there are no restrictions on the free flow of information
strains credulity. One need only look at the success of advertising campaigns for cigarettes
among youth to realize that the truth does not always win in the market of commercial ideas
regarding the desirability of products or services. See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra note 138, at
1208. Indeed, the inability of consumers to accurately internalize the economic costs and
benefits in response to lengthy, confusing disclosure and conflicting commercial messages has
been well-documented in the empirical literature. See generally, e.g., Martin J. Eppler &
Jeanne Mengis, The Concept of Information Overload: A Review of Literature from Organization Science, Accounting, Marketing, MIS, and Related Disciplines, 5 INFO. SOC’Y 325 (2004)
(summarizing the relevant literature across disciplines).

R
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public sphere.”142 Post’s approach implies, then, that paternalism—limiting individual autonomy—is justified if it is necessary to promote the
collective enterprise of democracy.
But this view is far from predominant. Other scholars emphasize
that American democracy is indeed a liberal democracy, in which individual autonomy is a value inherently worthy of normative respect. Martin Redish, for example, argues that “speech concerning commercial
products and services can facilitate private self-government in much the
same way that political speech fosters collective self-government,” and
in his view, “[b]oth private and collective self-government are grounded
in identical normative concerns about self-development and self-determination.”143 It follows from this normative commitment to self-government that paternalism is highly problematic.
Unfortunately, neither conception of the role of liberty and individual autonomy seems entirely compelling. Post’s emphasis on the collective nature of democracy seems to beg the question of the normative
value scheme that lies at the heart of the debate over commercial speech.
Whether American democracy should privilege the autonomy of speakers conveying truthful information that is commercial in nature is precisely the question at issue. The statement that democracy “is about
collective self-determination” rather than “individual self-government”
seems little more than a conclusory restatement of the normative assumption that individual autonomy is not worthy of protection. The key question, as Redish correctly points out, is why Post’s notion of collective
democracy should be preferred over the alternative of liberalism.144
On the other hand, Redish’s view fails to persuade as well. Even if
one assumes that private and collective self-government derive from a
common commitment to self-determination, it does not follow that the
legal protection given to both forms of speech should be identical or even
that the ambit of the First Amendment encompass both. Numerous constitutional doctrines advance abstract normative principles of justice,
equality, and freedom—but they do not receive identical doctrinal protection, nor do they all fall within the same constitutional provision. In
that sense, Redish’s argument proves too much: interpreting the First
142 Robert C. Post, Viewpoint Discrimination and Commercial Speech, 41 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 169, 175–76 (2000).
143 Martin H. Redish, Commercial Speech, First Amendment Intuitionism, and the Twilight Zone of Viewpoint Discrimination, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 67, 81 (2007).
144 Id. at 80–81 (“If one were to define ‘commercial speech’ as speech concerning commercial products or services, I suppose one starting from the premise that the First Amendment
is primarily or exclusively designed to protect speech relevant to the political process would
logically conclude that commercial speech is deserving of little or no First Amendment protection. I have attacked this view as flawed because it fails to determine the normative reasons
our system would choose democracy in the first place.” (emphasis added)).
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Amendment solely in light of a highly abstract normative commitment to
self-government suggests that nearly any expressive human activity is
entitled to its protection.
It seems that these views can be reconciled, however, by focusing
more tightly on the distinction between paternalism and the provision of
public goods. It is true that, at the most general level of abstraction,
individual well-being is itself a public good, as suboptimal decisions by
individuals reduce the overall level of welfare in society. But there is a
distinction between regulating commercial speech solely for the sake of
withholding information from consumers’ cognitive processes and regulating in order to prevent a social externality that would inevitably result
if the truthful—but socially harmful—information were to seep out into
the marketplace and affect consumer behavior.
We discuss the application of this distinction in existing law in the
following subsection, but consider the simple example of regulating disclosure in financial transactions. The recent financial crisis and ensuing
recession demonstrated the tremendous cost to society that resulted, at
least in part, from poor decisions by consumers regarding subprime
mortgages.145 It would be fundamentally inaccurate to characterize
mandatory mortgage disclosure regulation as nothing more than a paternalistic effort to control the information available to homeowners. Disclosures that increase the likelihood individual decisions will be truly
welfare-maximizing benefit society as a whole, not merely the homeowners who are the direct beneficiaries of the regulatory scheme. Mortgage disclosure is most accurately understood as regulation of
commercial speech that supplies a public good, namely, more efficient
pricing in housing and credit markets.
While helpful, this distinction is still rife with significant ambiguity.
Any given policy is likely to benefit both the recipients of information
and society as a whole. Of course, nothing in this discussion will yield a
mechanical classification system for commercial speech—the contours
of any legal doctrine ultimately reduce to difficult judgments in borderline cases. But the advantage of this definition is that it permits ascribing
a predictable probability of heightened constitutional protection according to the degree to which the speech advances clearly defined public
goods rather than the well-being of individual consumers.

145 See generally FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT:
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 67 (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf (explaining the history of subprime mortgages and how consumers’ poor decisions with them partially led to the recent financial crisis).
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A good example of this predictive power is Educational Media Co.
v. Swecker, discussed previously.146 Swecker was decided several years
after a very similar case in the Third Circuit, Pitt News v. Pappert.147 In
Pitt News, then-Circuit Judge Alito, writing for the majority, struck down
a Pennsylvania law prohibiting advertisement of alcoholic beverages in
media affiliated with educational institutions.148 While the court technically found that the advertisement failed the third and fourth prongs of
Central Hudson,149 its rationale and justification are telling:
The suggestion that the elimination of alcoholic beverage ads from The Pitt News and other publications connected with the University will slacken the demand for
alcohol by Pitt students is counterintuitive and unsupported by any evidence that the Commonwealth has
called to our attention. Nor has the Commonwealth
pointed to any evidence that the elimination of alcoholic
beverage ads from The Pitt News will make it harder for
would-be purchasers to locate places near campus where
alcoholic beverages may be purchased.150
Viewing this statement through a doctrinal lens might suggest Alito was
merely applying a type of narrow tailoring test within the Central Hudson framework. But as we described previously, the Central Hudson
framework is highly malleable, and what better proof of that than the
Fourth Circuit’s decision in Swecker? But the paternalism v. public
goods distinction sheds great light on these two cases. The Swecker
court was convinced that prohibiting the advertising would in fact improve public safety.151 The Pitt News court was not.152
Accordingly, despite the Court’s lip service in Sorrell to the content
and speaker-based restriction, it is the probability of contributing to a
public good that has consistently led courts to distinguish justified regulation from unwarranted paternalism. In Sorrell, the Court simply
seemed unconvinced that the public interest was served by what
amounted to little more than state-sanctioned favoring of generic drug
manufacturers over their name-brand competitors.153 Similarly, in
Caronia, one way to understand the majority’s decision was that it apparently did not believe that prohibition of truthful off-label marketing had a
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153

602 F.3d 583 (4th Cir. 2010).
379 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 2004).
Id. at 101.
Id. at 107–08.
Id. at 107.
Swecker, 602 F.3d at 589.
Pitt News, 379 F.3d at 107.
Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc. , 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2658 (2011).
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substantial benefit to society. In the following section, we discuss the
benefits of regulating truthful commercial speech more generally, as this
is one of the most hotly contested areas of First Amendment
jurisprudence.
B. The Benefits of Regulating Truthful Commercial Speech
In the prior section, we discussed the theoretical justification for
regulating commercial speech under the First Amendment and the implications for democracy and individual autonomy. In short, the promotion
of the public good is a legitimate rationale whereas mere paternalism
falls short. Here we discuss three instrumental benefits to society from
restricting truthful commercial speech: (1) the difficulty of distinguishing
truthful from false commercial speech, (2) the indirect benefit of prophylactically regulating truth to ameliorate evidentiary challenges with proving falsity, and (3) encouraging substantive compliance with a beneficial
regulatory system. Applying strict scrutiny to the regulation of truthful
speech would deprive society of these benefits, which are given concrete
expression in numerous areas of law.
1. Difficulty of Distinguishing Truthful from Misleading
Commercial Speech
A primary benefit of regulating truthful commercial speech is that it
is often difficult to distinguish between truth and misleading falsehood.
In Robert Post’s words, “putting aside outright false communications, the
difficulties of identifying misleading statements seem as formidable in
the area of commercial speech as in the arena of public discourse.”154
He points to the Court’s statement in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel, that “distinguishing deceptive from nondeceptive advertising in
virtually any field of commerce may require resolution of exceedingly
complex and technical factual issues and the consideration of nice questions of semantics.”155 In a classic article, Judge Alex Kozinski and Stuart Banner give a powerful illustration of the conceptual challenge of
identifying misleading commercial speech:
What about a television commercial that shows a man
using a particular brand of deodorant and, as an apparent
result, leading a much more vigorous social life? How
could we ascertain the truth of that commercial? Does it
even have a truth? It is intended to plant the suggestion
in the minds of consumers that this deodorant is a desirable product, but surely a purchaser cannot claim to have
154
155

Post, supra note 134, at 37.
471 U.S. 626, 645 (1985).
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been defrauded when he fails to acquire a new group of
friends.156
The problem is that the nature of the advertising message is not verifiable
fact. However, the effectiveness of a pharmaceutical drug for treating a
particular condition is a matter of fact. What is the barrier to holding
such commercial speech to a standard of objective falsity?
We suggest that, while the uses of a drug are more factual than the
example Kozinski and Banner give, the core problem is that the effectiveness and safety of such uses is not always empirically verified. Determining the truthfulness of a statement that “drug X is suitable for
condition Y” requires conducting complex scientific studies and evaluating empirical evidence. The inability to instantly verify the ex ante accuracy of every claim regarding a drug’s usage justifies the regulation of
(potentially) truthful statements.
In other words, we agree with the premise of Kozinski and Banner’s
argument: it is often difficult to discern whether commercial speech is
truthful. But while they argue that these expressive examples demonstrate the need for non-regulation akin to that of political speech,157 we
suggest that just the opposite is true with respect to pharmaceutical drug
marketing. More generally, when the problem of regulating commercial
speech lies not in the objectivity of the statements but rather in the practical capability to empirically verify their truthfulness, prophylactic regulation of potentially truthful statements is justified. This is because such
regulation has a clear benefit—preventing the emergence of potentially
misleading claims—rather than clamping down on expressive speech
that has no factual nature as in Kozinski and Banner’s example.
Another way to see the factual nature and corresponding benefits of
prophylactically regulating statements regarding drug effectiveness is to
consider the injury that would result from the lack of regulation. With
many examples of commercial speech—such as advertising common
consumer products—the potential injury that would result, in expected
value terms, from misleading communication is likely to be small. We
could imagine a probability distribution of harm, which would reflect the
amount of harm multiplied by its ex ante likelihood of occurring. With
common consumer products, even if this curve had a long tail—i.e., there
exists some extremely low probability that a consumer will suffer serious
harm—it is reasonable to assume that the mean of the distribution would
lie at a low level of expected injury.

156 Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L.
REV. 627, 635 (1990).
157 Id. at 636–38.

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\23-2\CJP203.txt

368

CORNELL JOURNAL

unknown

OF

LAW

AND

Seq: 32

PUBLIC POLICY

28-APR-14

12:57

[Vol. 23:337

With pharmaceutical drugs, however, this distribution would appear
markedly different. The harm that could result from misusing a drug
would be greater both in magnitude and probability. The magnitude of
the injury would be much greater because of the potential powerful effects of pharmaceutical products on the physical body. Similarly, the
probability of harm would also be greater because, unlike most consumer
products, misuse of a pharmaceutical product is likely to harm the majority of users (even if it benefits some), whereas many ordinary products
pose little to no risk of injury. We are not suggesting that regulators
consider only the potential harms of pharmaceutical drugs—indeed,
many have substantial net benefit to society—but rather that the costs of
misleading marketing in this context are fundamentally different from
those of the traditional consumer products that Kozinski and Banner
identify.
Indeed, statements regarding the effectiveness and safety of drugs
are deeply factual in nature rather than being matters of subjective opinion, such as whether using a particular deodorant will make one happy in
life. Inaccuracy regarding drug effectiveness and safety has substantial
costs, while inaccuracy regarding the benefits of deodorant exacts a comparatively small price. The challenge with regulating off-label marketing
of pharmaceuticals lies in the inability to instantly verify the accuracy of
factual claims regarding safety and effectiveness, not whether lack of
regulation would exact a high price. Accordingly, the key question is
whether the benefits of regulating truthful speech outweigh the costs of
preventing drugs from reaching the market under these conditions of factual uncertainty. There might be situations in which the empirical safety
or effectiveness of a pharmaceutical drug has been objectively verified
by scientific research. Regulating truthful speech may still be justified
under the theory that requiring regulatory preapproval ameliorates evidentiary challenges with proving false speech, as the next subsection
explains.
2. Ameliorating Evidentiary Challenges with Proving Falsehood
Even if the truthful nature of the commercial speech is indisputable—e.g., established by reputable scientific research—there may still be
societal benefits to prohibiting such speech if there is a high probability
that it will be accompanied by false statements that are difficult to prove.
With advertising in general, if the line between truthful puffery and misleading exaggeration is conceptually tenuous, it seems likely that many
advertisers would cross this line in either direction. In the case of verifiable factual claims, such as the effectiveness of a pharmaceutical drug,
the legitimate fear of crossing the line might manifest as reliance on
questionable studies or other tainted data.
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A second justification, therefore, for prohibiting truthful off-label
marketing can be found in the concern that putatively truthful statements
are accompanied by untrue exaggerations or inferences in practice. In
Caronia, for example, Mr. Caronia claimed that while Xyrem was approved for narcolepsy, “because of the properties that . . . it has it’s going
to insomnia, Fibromyalgia[,] periodic leg movement, restless leg, ahh
also looking at ahh Parkinson’s and . . . other sleep disorders are underway such as MS.”158 Whether Xyrem is safe or effective for these uses
is likely to be a mix of truth and falsehood. In 2010, the FDA rejected
Xyrem’s request for approval as a treatment for fibromyalgia and insomnia, finding that it had no effect on sleep but did reduce pain, yet nonetheless concluding that the abuse and dependency risks of using it for
fibromyalgia outweighed the benefit.159 Accordingly, prohibiting
Caronia’s truthful speech about fibromyalgia would prophylactically extend to the false speech about insomnia.
There are likely numerous instances of off-label marketing such as
this, where the defining characteristic of the speech is not whether it can
be proven truthful but rather the conveyance of falsity (by commission or
omission) in a manner that is difficult to prove. Challenges of proof may
result from intertwining truth and falsity, such that it is difficult to isolate
and extract the false portion of the speech. Similarly, proof may be difficult when the underlying scientific studies are ambiguous or contradictory—an agent might be relying on one outlier study while the body of
scientific evidence goes the other way. The government simply might
not find it worth the expense to pursue prosecution in these types of
situations. A regulatory prohibition on all forms of off-label marketing
thus encompasses cases in which falsity is distributed in circumstances
where ex post proof would be difficult.
Indeed, a similar rationale appears elsewhere in the law. As we
discuss in Part II.C, securities regulation provides a useful analogical
framework to guiding the development of FDA rules on off-label marketing. A classic challenge in the securities laws is how to address forwardlooking or optimistic statements. As these types of statements concern
the future, they lack a present state of truth or falsehood but will either be
accurate or inaccurate at a future date. This is analogous to intertwining
truth and falsehood in communication such as in Caronia, except that the
mix is temporal in nature: speech will become true or false as time unfolds. In Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., the D.C. Circuit held
that “projections and statements of optimism are false and misleading for
158

U.S. v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 156 (2d Cir. 2012).
Matt McMillen, FDA Panel Rejects Xyrem as Fibromyalgia Treatment, WEBMD
(Aug. 20, 2010), http://www.webmd.com/fibromyalgia/news/20100820/fda-panel-rejects-xy
rem-as-fibromyalgia-treatment.
159
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the purposes of the securities laws if they were issued without good faith
or lacked a reasonable basis when made.”160
The reasonable basis standard, therefore, serves to restrain putatively non-false speech when it is made in order to ameliorate the challenge of discerning which speech is likely to become false over time.
Subjecting commercial speech that is not presently false to the reasonable basis restraint is justified under the rationale that determining which
projections or optimistic statements are likely to be false is extraordinarily difficult. Such a justification applies with equal force to FDA regulation of off-label marketing: requiring preapproval for marketing for any
uses would ameliorate the challenges (in the counterfactual universe of
no preapproval) with demonstrating in ex post litigation that statements
regarding certain uses are categorically false.
3. Encouraging Substantive Compliance with a Regulatory
System
Finally, restricting truthful commercial speech can bring society the
benefits of increased compliance with the substantive requirements of a
regulatory system. Speech that encourages bypassing the protections
provided by regulation may increase the prevalence of socially detrimental activities that the governmental scheme seeks to prevent. For example, off-label marketing facilitates the increased use of pharmaceutical
drugs for purposes that have not undergone FDA testing and approval.
As off-label uses are likely, on average, to be less safe than approved
uses—despite providing additional treatment—the FDA prohibition on
promoting off-label use brings society the benefits of increased safety as
a result of greater compliance with the FDA approval process.
However, as this example demonstrates, increased substantive compliance with a regulatory regime does not necessarily imply an increased
societal benefit. The safety benefits of requiring relatively more FDA
approvals may be outweighed by the cost of depriving patients of potentially life-saving treatments. But even if on average the substantive costs
of increased compliance exceed its benefits, a regulatory regime provides
an independent benefit by reducing the variance of potential outcomes.
As humans tend to be risk-averse, holding all else equal, society might
prefer a state of affairs where the risk/reward spread is narrower. Without off-label uses, fewer patients might recover from life-threatening ill160 16 F.3d 1271, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citing Isquith v. Middle South Utils., Inc., 847
F.2d 186, 203–04 (5th Cir. 1988); In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, at 371
(3d Cir. 1993); Roots P’ship v. Lands’ End, Inc., 965 F.2d 1411, 1417 (7th Cir. 1992); Sinay v.
Lamson & Sessions Co., 948 F.2d 1037, 1040 (6th Cir. 1991)); see also Bruce A. Hiler, The
SEC and the Courts’ Approach to Disclosure of Earnings Projections, Asset Appraisals, and
Other Soft Information: Old Problems, Changing Views, 46 MD. L. REV. 1114, 1123 (1987).
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nesses, but it is also true that fewer will die from unexpected side effects
of mislabeled drugs. An example of a social acceptance of this principle
is found in the largely accepted ethical norm that affirmatively taking life
is more morally blameworthy than failing to save life when one’s own
life might be at risk.161 Society recognizes the difference between obligating individuals not to affirmatively harm others—a matter of certainty—and intervening in conditions of uncertainty, even if, on average,
such interventions would lead to a reduction in the loss of life. Preferring safety to risky reward by reducing the variance of outcomes is a
legitimate social interest, even if the costs exceed the benefits on
average.
In addition to reducing risky outcomes, other values are arguably
worthy of substantive protection through a regulatory regime. As noted
in the prior subsection, the definition of false and misleading commercial
speech includes promoting outcomes for which one lacks a reasonable
basis in fact.162 A prohibition on truthful commercial speech such as offlabel marketing can go one step further and encourage a level of care
beyond merely a reasonable basis. Indeed, even if reasonable basis is the
desired substantive standard, a prohibition on speech lacking regulatory
approval can reduce the subjectivity inherent in such a determination,
giving speakers greater confidence that speech will not be found false ex
post. This is related to the previous point on variance of outcomes: substantive compliance has independent value linked to the certainty and
risk-reducing benefits of obtaining regulatory approval.
Regardless of the normative tradeoff of risk versus reward, it seems
that increasing substantive compliance with a regulatory regime plausibly provides a benefit that is at least worthy of constitutional protection.
If our democratically elected legislature has opted to subject market
transactions to regulatory approval—either directly or by delegating authority to a regulatory body—incentivizing the substantive benefits that
result from increasing compliance with this regime arguably justifies a
restraint on truthful commercial speech, even if those benefits remain
limited to reducing uncertain outcomes.
Indeed, one area in which the benefits of encouraging substantive
compliance are particularly evident is compelled speech. As Jennifer
Pomeranz points out in a recent article on the implications of Sorrell,
numerous regulatory regimes impose mandatory disclosure requirements.163 Specific examples include the securities laws, discussed at
length in the next section, as well as nutrition labeling, allergen labeling,
161 This norm underlies the general rule that there is no duty to rescue at the common law.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965).
162 Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
163 Pomeranz, supra note 3, at 403.

R
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and tobacco labeling.164 Mandatory disclosure improves efficiency and
fairness by reducing misallocation of resources and ensuring that consumers have access to essential information regarding products and services regardless of socioeconomic status or other private means of
obtaining information. The compulsion of commercial speech, therefore,
directly furthers these societal goals.
C. The Securities Act of 1933 as an Analogous Regulatory Scheme
The Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”) provides a useful
analogy to FDA regulation of off-label marketing for two reasons. First,
its constitutionality is suspect under a literal reading of Caronia, as its
restriction on making offers of securities is both “content-based”—applying solely to securities transactions—and “speaker-based”—applying
to certain types of issuers and not others. The Securities Act thus provides a useful reductio ad absurdum demonstration of the weakness of
the majority’s reasoning in Caronia. Second, the Securities Act constitutes an informative example of how to balance the tension between paternalism and the public good in the context of speech regulation. The
specific policies it employs can serve as useful analogies to reform the
FDA’s policy regarding the off-label marketing of pharmaceutical drugs.
1. Regulating Speech Independent of Transactions: Section 5
and Exemptions to the Registration Requirement
A fundamental characteristic of the regulatory scheme established
by the Securities Act is its regulation of speech regarding investment
activity and not merely the transactions constituting such activity. Section 5(c) of the Securities Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the
mails to offer to sell or offer to buy through the use or
medium of any prospectus or otherwise any security, unless a registration statement has been filed as to such security, or while the registration statement is the subject
of a refusal order or stop order or (prior to the effective
date of the registration statement) any public proceeding
or examination under section 77h of this title.165
Section 5(c) therefore prohibits offers to buy or sell securities unless a
registration statement has been filed in accordance with the statute. Two
parallel provisions, section 5(a) and 5(b), prohibit the sale of a security
164
165

Id. at 405–06.
15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2006) (emphasis added).
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until a registration statement has been declared effective, as well as the
sale of a security without an attached prospectus that conforms to the
statutory requirement.166
Section 7 of the Securities Act specifies the required contents of a
registration statement,167 which includes elements such as the names of
beneficial owners, a list of material contracts, and financial statements.168 Section 10 provides that a prospectus must contain a subset of
the elements that are required to be filed with the registration statement.169 To ensure compliance with these requirements, sections 11 and
12(a)(2) establish private causes of action for injured investors to sue for
false or misleading statements in the registration statement or prospectus,
respectfully.170 Section 12(a)(1) also grants purchasers a right of rescission if the securities were sold in violation of section 5.171
The net effect of the section 5 regulatory scheme is to prohibit offers—communications regarding the sale of securities—until the statutory requirements for a valid registration statement and prospectus have
been satisfied. Indeed, the term “offer” is defined very broadly by the
statute as including “every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation
of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security, for value,”172 and as
such is plainly not restricted to the common-law definition of “offer.”173
While the statute excludes “preliminary negotiations” and agreements
between issuers and underwriters,174 the prohibition on offers sweeps
very broadly and encompasses “the publication of information and statements, and publicity efforts, generally, made in advance of a proposed
financing” even if “not couched in terms of an express offer” as long as
they “contribute to conditioning the public mind or arousing public interest in the issuer or in the securities of an issuer in a manner which raises
a serious question whether the publicity is not in fact part of the selling
effort.”175
166

Id. § 77e(a), 77e(b).
Id. § 77g.
168 Id. § 77aa sched. A.
169 Id. § 77j.
170 Id. § 77k, 77l(a)(2).
171 See id. § 77k.
172 Id. § 77b(3).
173 See, e.g., Diskin v. Lomasney & Co., 452 F.2d 871, 875 (2d. Cir. 1971); SEC v.
Cavanagh, 1 F. Supp. 2d 337, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
174 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3).
175 Statement of Commission Relating to Publication of Information Prior to or After
Effective Date of Registration Statement, Securities Act Release No. 33-3844, 22 Fed. Reg.
8359 (Oct. 8, 1957); see also Offers and Sales of Securities by Underwriters and Dealers,
Securities Act Release No. 33-4697, 29 Fed. Reg. 7317 (May 28, 1964); Publication of Information Prior to or After Filing and Effective Date of Registration Statement, Securities Act
Release No. 33-5009, 34 Fed. Reg. 16,870 (Oct. 7, 1969); Guidelines for Release of Informa167
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However, the statute defines several exemptions to the registration
requirement. As we explain in the following subsection, these serve to
illuminate many of the underlying purposes of the Securities Act and
reflect the fundamental distinction between paternalism and the provision
of public goods. Analogies to these exemptions can guide the development of a more effective FDA regulatory policy with respect to off-label
marketing.
The most commonly utilized exemptions involving securities are
found in section 4(a)(2) and Regulation D of the Securities Act. Section
4(a)(2) provides that the provisions of section 5 do not apply to “transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering.”176 While this is a
highly fact-intensive inquiry, in Securities Act Release No. 4552 the SEC
defined a series of factors which are used to determine whether a transaction does not involve a public offering, including the number of offerees,
the size of the offering, public versus private advertising of the offering,
whether the purchasers are acquiring the securities for investment purposes rather than resale, and the period of retention.177 In 2010, the
ABA Section of Business Law Committee on the Federal Regulation of
Securities summarized the following four factors for the section 4(a)(2)
exemption: (1) manner of offering, (2) eligibility of the purchasers, (3)
information, and (4) resales.178 In short, these various formulations of
the private placement exemption under section 4(a)(2) reflect the notion
that reduced disclosure is permitted for offerings made to a certain group
of purchasers, one that is restricted and “non-public” in nature.
A similar policy underlies the exemptions under Regulation D.
Regulation D contains three exemptions under Rules 504, 505, and
506.179 The technical requirements for each are complex but, in short,
Rule 504 applies to offerings by non-reporting companies with an aggregate offering price of $1 million per year or less.180 Rule 505 applies to
offerings by any company with an aggregate offering price of $5 million
per year or less but, crucially, the offering may only be made to so-called
“accredited investors” and up to thirty-five non-accredited investors.181
The definition of “accredited investor” is complex but includes corporation by Issuers Whose Securities Are in Registration, Securities Act Release No. 33-5180, 36
Fed. Reg. 16,506 (Aug. 16, 1971).
176 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2).
177 Non-Public Offering Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 33-4552, 27 Fed. Reg.
11,316 (Nov. 6, 1962).
178 Comm. on Fed. Regulation of Sec., ABA Section of Bus. Law, Law of Private Placements (Non-Public Offerings) Not Entitled to Benefits of Safe Harbors—A Report, 66 BUS.
LAW. 85, 93 (2010).
179 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504–.506 (2013).
180 Id. § 230.504.
181 Id. §§ 230.505, 230.501(a).
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tions with assets exceeding $5 million and individuals with a net worth
exceeding $1 million.182
Rule 506 is not an independent exemption but provides a safe harbor under section 4(a)(2) for any size offering with accredited investor
restrictions similar to Rule 505. However, the thirty-five non-accredited
investors must be sophisticated investors, i.e., having “such knowledge
and experience in financial and business matters that [the purchaser] is
capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment,
or the issuer reasonably believes immediately prior to making any sale
that such purchaser comes within this description.”183 Accordingly, the
exemptions and safe harbors provided by Regulation D seek to accomplish similar goals as section 4(a)(2), namely permitting non-restricted
communications regarding investment transactions to a restricted audience of non-public, sophisticated, or “accredited” investors.
2. The Constitutionality of Regulating Offers Under the
Securities Act of 1933
The only Supreme Court case in which certiorari was putatively
granted to resolve the question of the constitutionality of restrictions on
communications under the securities laws was Lowe v. SEC.184 However, the Lowe Court found that the statute did not prohibit the communication at issue and thus elected not to opine on the First Amendment
issue.185 Indeed, lower courts have repeatedly rejected constitutional
challenges to the securities laws on First Amendment grounds.186 It
seems that, as a matter of doctrinal law, the dominant view is that the
restrictions on commercial speech regarding investment transactions
found in the Securities Act and related statutes are constitutional.
Scholars have varying views on this issue. Some have argued that
courts’ refusals to seriously consider the constitutional implications of
restricting offers of securities plainly contradicts the commercial speech
doctrine as developed in Central Hudson and subsequent case law.187
182

Id. § 230.501(a).
Id. § 230.506(b)(ii).
184 472 U.S. 181 (1985).
185 Id. at 210.
186 E.g., SEC v. Wall St. Publ’g Inst., Inc., 851 F.2d 365, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see also R
& W Technical Servs. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 205 F.3d 165, 174–76 (5th
Cir. 2000) (refusing to extend Lowe to apply to the Commodities Exchange Act).
187 E.g., Aleta G. Estreicher, Securities Regulation and the First Amendment, 24 GA. L.
REV. 223, 225–26 (1990); Donald E. Lively, Securities Regulation and Freedom of the Press:
Toward a Marketplace of Ideas in the Marketplace of Investment, 60 WASH. L. REV. 843, 847
(1985); Burt Neuborne, The First Amendment and Government Regulation of Capital Markets,
55 BROOK. L. REV. 5, 6–9 (1989); Michael E. Schoeman, The First Amendment and Restrictions on Advertising of Securities Under the Securities Act of 1933, 41 BUS. LAW. 377, 386
(1986). Some practitioners sounded a similar view in the wake of Lowe. E.g., James C.
183
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These scholars would likely point to Caronia and Sorrell as examples of
courts properly engaging with the constitutional issues implicated by restricting commercial speech in the pharmaceutical contexts. Others have
suggested that securities regulation—like antitrust and other areas of economic regulation—simply falls outside the scope of the First Amendment,188 but these views are difficult to reconcile with these two recent
cases.
Yet it is possible to take a more balanced approach that reflects the
theory of the First Amendment developed above and does not contradict
the underlying policy rationale in Sorrell. In the context of securities
regulation, the paternalism versus public good distinction is particularly
compelling: deceptive communication is likely to further the misallocation of capital, the prevention of which is not merely a paternalistic intervention to protect individuals from the adverse consequences of poor
decision-making. Rather, promoting an efficient allocation of investment
capital improves overall social welfare. Society as a whole benefits
when firms are selected for investment based on true profitability, rather
than false pretenses. The efficient flow of capital promotes employment
and consumer and producer welfare by encouraging competitive market
pricing. Society has a strong interest in preventing fraud, deception, and
misleading statements from distorting the investment analysis.189
The absence of a purely paternalistic motive—and the corresponding presence of a compelling public good—explains the general resistance to invalidating the securities laws under the commercial speech
doctrine. But this theory can also shed light on the specific doctrines and
exemptions articulated in the prior subsection. Take, for example, the
“accredited investor” definition. The requirement of a minimum net
worth functions as a proxy for access to investment advisors and the
negotiating leverage to compel the necessary disclosure that would prevent a misallocation of capital.
This is another persuasive example of the absence of a paternalistic
motive in the securities laws: misleading disclosure may just as easily
harm high net-worth investors. Indeed, some have argued that the notion
of an accredited investor is flawed for this very reason: highly intelligent
recent graduates of finance programs are likely more capable of preventing harm to themselves than wealthy but ignorant individuals.190 But
Goodale, The First Amendment and the Securities Act: A Collision Course?, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 8,
1983, at 1.
188 E.g., Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1768 (2004).
189 This explanation, however, does not account for why, in the quest to promote allocative efficiency, government intervention is relatively superior to market self-discipline.
190 E.g., Wallis K. Finger, Unsophisticated Wealth: Reconsidering the SEC’s “Accredited
Investor” Definition Under the 1933 Act, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 733 (2009).
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this paternalistic approach is precisely what the Court has resisted
throughout the development of its First Amendment jurisprudence.
When viewed through the lens of furthering the public good of allocative
efficiency, negotiating leverage—not financial know-how—is much
more likely to compel counterparty disclosure and ensure that resources
are properly allocated throughout society. Negotiating leverage, of
course, is largely determined by financial resources, suggesting that Regulation D’s accredited investor definition constitutionally reflects a public good rather than paternalistic motive.
The more general statutory exemption in section 4(a)(2) seems more
problematic to justify under this rationale because of the Court’s statement in the seminal case interpreting section 4(a)(2), SEC v. Ralston
Purina Corp.: “An offering to those who are shown to be able to fend for
themselves is a transaction ‘not involving any public offering.’”191 Such
a statement has a strong paternalistic ring, but the Court’s commercial
speech jurisprudence has evolved over time. Ralston Purina was decided in 1953—over twenty years before Virginia Pharmacy,192 the first
major commercial speech case that eventually led to Central Hudson. It
is likely that justification seemed constitutional at that time, which was
well before the courts rejected certain paternalistic regulation of commercial speech. Moreover, the notion of “fend[ing] for themselves”
could refer not necessarily to a paternalistic self-protection rationale, but
rather to the public benefit of informed investment which leads to greater
allocative efficiency. The line between the two is razor-thin, but there is
a fundamental difference between restricting speech to protect individuals for their own sake and protecting individuals for the sake of others.
Ensuring that participants in a market are fully informed, even if they
would prefer not to be, can be justified under the latter rationale without
necessarily having a paternalistic nature.
3. Analogous Principles for FDA Regulation
The principles behind the restriction on offers and exemptions in the
securities laws can inform the development of a more nuanced approach
to regulating the off-label marketing of prescription drugs. In the next
Part, we present detailed proposals for reforming the FDA regulations,
but it is worth first examining how the aforementioned rules of securities
regulation strike a careful balance between restricting speech to promote
the public good and upholding autonomy and liberty by permitting the
free flow of information.
191
192

346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953) (emphasis added).
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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As a starting point, there are many similarities between the section 5
prohibition on offers for the sale of securities and the FDCA’s requirement of FDA approval prior to marketing pharmaceutical drugs. Both
restrict communication regarding a transaction in addition to regulating
the substantive transaction itself, and both give administrative agencies
the discretion to permit such communication under certain conditions. In
short, both regimes constitute powerful restraints on commercial speech.
The underlying rationales of the two regimes are similar as well.
Section 5 seeks to protect unwary purchasers from buying securities
based on inadequate information,193 above and beyond the prohibition on
fraud—i.e., false or misleading statements—that would apply under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or at the common law. Similarly, as
described previously, FDA preapproval developed out of a similar recognition that ex post liability for misleading promotion of pharmaceuticals
was insufficient to protect society from the harmful consequences of the
proliferation of unsafe drugs.194 The recognition of a need to restrain
communication until regulatory approval may be obtained derived in
both contexts from an understanding that courts and ex post litigation are
insufficiently competent in institutional terms to provide an adequate
level of protection for consumers and investors.
Despite these similarities, there is a crucial difference that is essential to understanding the limits of drawing analogies between the two
regimes. The section 5 preapproval process is limited to ensuring adequate disclosure, which includes the list of required elements found in
section 7 of the Securities Act.195 A fundamental principle of federal
securities regulation is the lack of substantive review by the SEC regarding the value of the investment opportunity.196 On the other hand, FDA
review is fundamentally substantive in nature: the agency is tasked with
ensuring not only adequate disclosure—i.e., sufficiently detailed labeling—but also that the safety and effectiveness of a pharmaceutical drug
justifies its marketing and sale to the public. Moreover, as we have discussed throughout this Article, this substantive review is conducted with
regard to specific uses—the question of off-label marketing arises not
with respect to drugs that have never received FDA approval for any use,
193 See, e.g., Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 638 (1988) (“The primary purpose of the
Securities Act is to protect investors by requiring publication of material information thought
necessary to allow them to make informed investment decisions concerning public offerings of
securities in interstate commerce.” (citing SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124
(1953))).
194 See Janssen, supra note 72, at 429.
195 15 U.S.C. § 77g (2006).
196 For a summary and critique of the disclosure-centric approach to U.S. securities regulation, see generally Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure
Antidote: Toward a More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV.
139 (2006).

R
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but rather with respect to a particular use that has not (yet) been
approved.
Because drugs are inherently dangerous products,197 there is always
the need to balance the risk of adverse effects with the benefits of treatment. That is why the FDA may approve a drug for one indication and
not for another. In addition, a drug is deemed defective unless proper
warnings are given. As a result, both the intended use and the labeling
are integral to the product being sold. Thus, the mandatory labeling is
distinguishable from both the liquor price advertising at issue in 44 Liquormart and the advertising of compounded drugs at issue in Western
States Medical (because the Western States pharmacist was mixing preapproved active ingredients and not promoting unapproved uses). Instead, requiring the proper label on a drug is more akin to requiring that
liquor bottles be labeled with the correct volume and proof.
The substantive nature of FDA review means that it is far more
sweeping and restrictive than the SEC’s check for adequacy of disclosure. It is only natural to conclude that there are likely to be constitutional implications to the differing degrees of the restraint on commercial
speech between these two regimes. We are not suggesting that the FDA
preapproval requirement is unconstitutional, but rather pointing out that
the different degrees of severity of restraint on speech has First Amendment implications and should therefore inform the development of a
more nuanced doctrine. In particular, it seems at least presumptively justified to construe exemptions to the FDA preapproval process more
broadly than their Securities Act counterparts because the former play a
more important role in protecting speech than the latter.
Indeed, the two exemptions to the SEC registration requirement provide useful guidance for construing a more balanced approach to FDA
regulation of off-label marketing. As we emphasized in the prior subsection, both Regulation D and section 4(a)(2) are consistent with an underlying rationale of promoting allocative efficiency—the conditions for
utilizing these exemptions reflect an assumption that investors in these
circumstances will be capable of eliciting the truth necessary to make an
informed and accurate investment decision. The analogy to FDA regulation lies in this truth-discovery function: if one were to consider exemptions to the prohibition on off-label marketing, just as with the Securities
Act they should be justified under a theory that the specific conditions
for obtaining such exemptions are likely to ensure that truth will be sufficiently ascertained to promote an efficient allocation of the benefits and
risks of pharmaceutical products. The twin notions of truthful facts and
197 Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977) (providing for strict liability for
“carr[ying] on an abnormally dangerous activity”).
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the ability to properly ascertain those facts are highly analogous to the
policies underlying Regulation D and section 4(a)(2).
In particular, consider the accredited and sophisticated investor requirements for utilizing the Rule 504, 505, or 506 exemptions under
Regulation D. The underlying theory is that investors with these financial resources are capable of compelling disclosure through bilateral bargaining because of the strength of their balance sheets. Put differently,
economic resources serve as a proxy for the probability of obtaining and
ascertaining the truth in a bilateral manner, i.e., without compulsory disclosure. In the FDA context, one might analogously point to the scientific knowledge that medical professionals hold as an effective proxy for
the probability that the truthful content of information regarding the offlabel effectiveness of a drug will accurately be ascertained. The existence of preexisting scientific knowledge can be thought of as rendering
a doctor an “accredited consumer of information” who is capable of distinguishing between truthful data regarding the effectiveness of a particular drug from the mere puffery that would lead unsophisticated
consumers astray. We return to this point in Part III when discussing our
proposal to permit the distribution of independent scientific studies to
physicians.
In a similar manner, the Security Act’s more general section 4(a)(2)
private placement doctrine can be understood as recognizing the danger
of widespread public disclosure of potentially misleading information,
even if it contains partial truth. This goes beyond the sophistication of
individual consumers of information to the size of the audience to which
the speech is directed. The conditions for qualifying for the section
4(a)(2) exemption reflect an understanding that the social cost of widespread marketing of potentially misleading information is likely to exceed the benefits of the dissemination of truth. Applying this rationale to
FDA regulation suggests that a more nuanced framework might distinguish between different forms of off-label marketing according to the
size of the audience. Marketing directly to the public might be more
worthy of an absolute prohibition than off-label usage information “privately placed” among a smaller group. In short, a comprehensive reform
to FDA regulation of off-label marketing should consider both the informational competency of the audience as well as its size—both of these
factors contribute to the likelihood that a commercial speech is likely to
impose a cost on society, justifying a restraint under a public good theory
rather than mere paternalism.
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FDA RULES ON OFF-LABEL MARKETING
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS

A. The Food and Drug Administration’s 2011 Draft Guidance for
Responding to Unsolicited Requests for Off-Label Information
In December 2011, the FDA published the Guidance for Industry:
Responding to Unsolicited Requests for Off-Label Information About
Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices draft (“2011 Draft Guidance”)198 in response to a citizen petition filed in July of 2011 seeking
clarification on permissible off-label promotions.199 The FDA defined
an “unsolicited request” as one “initiated by persons or entities that are
completely independent of the relevant firm.”200 Responses to these unsolicited requests comprise two categories—”requests made directly and
privately to firms and requests made in public forums, including through
emerging electronic media.”201
In introducing the subject, the FDA explained the rationale for loosening the absolute prohibition on distributing off-label information by
manufacturers to the general public:
FDA recognizes that firms are capable of responding to
requests about their own named products in a truthful,
non-misleading, and accurate manner. Furthermore, as
these firms are regulated by FDA and have robust and
current information about their products, FDA recognizes that it can be in the best interest of public health
for a firm to respond to unsolicited requests for information about off-label uses of the firm’s products that are
addressed to a public forum, as other participants in the
forum who offer responses may not provide or have access to the most accurate and up-to-date information
about the firm’s products.202
The 2011 Draft Guidance reassures firms that if they respond to unsolicited requests for off-label drug information as outlined within the document, the “FDA does not intend to use such responses as evidence of the
198

2011 DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 16.
Allergan, Inc., et al., Citizen Petition, Docket No. FDA-2011-P-0512 (July 5, 2011),
available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2011-P-0512-0001 (submitted on behalf of certain member companies of the Medical Information Working Group
(MIWG), a working group comprising major manufacturers of prescription drugs and medical
devices); see also “FDA Pressed to Clarify Permissible Formulary, Clinical Guideline Communications,” The Pink Sheet Daily (July 5, 2011), http://www.biopharmatoday.com/2011/07/
fda-pressed-to-clarify-permissible-formulary-clinical-guideline-communications.html.
200 2011 DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 16, at 4.
201 Id. at 3.
202 Id.
199
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firm’s intent that the product be used for an unapproved or uncleared
use.”203 Although this reassurance applies only to the FDA, not necessarily to the Department of Justice, one would expect the Justice Department to give considerable deference to the FDA on this issue. The 2011
Draft Guidance provides no protection for solicited requests, a point to
which we return in Part III.B.
In order to enjoy the benefit of the FDA’s proposed safe harbor for
responses to nonpublic, unsolicited requests for off-label information, the
information provided by the pharmaceutical company must be (a) provided directly in a private, one-on-one communication with the individual making the request, (b) tailored to answer only the specific questions
asked; (c) truthful, non-misleading, accurate, and balanced, (d) scientific
in nature, and (e) generated by medical or scientific personnel independent from sales or marketing departments.204
Information distributed in response to an unsolicited request should
be accompanied by: (a) a copy of the FDA-required labeling, if any, for
the product (e.g., FDA-approved package insert and, if the response is
for a consumer, FDA-approved patient labeling), (b) a prominent statement that (i) notifies the recipient that the FDA has not approved or
cleared the product for the off-label use and discloses the indications for
which FDA has approved or cleared the product and (ii) provides all
important safety information including, if applicable, any boxed warning
for the product, and (c) a complete list of references for all of the information disseminated in the response (e.g., a bibliography of publications
in peer-reviewed medical journals or in medical or scientific texts; citations for data on file, for summary documents, or for abstracts).205 Additionally, a firm should maintain records of (a) the nature of the request
for information, including the name, address, and affiliation of the re-

203 Id. at 9. However, the distinction between disseminating off-label information in a
promotional versus educational capacity is not always clear. See VANESSA K. BURROWS &
KATHLEEN ANN RUANE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40458, FDA GUIDANCE REGARDING THE
PROMOTION OF OFF-LABEL USES OF DRUGS: LEGAL ISSUES (2009). Also note that, unlike the
tack taken by the prosecution in the closing arguments to the jury in Caronia, which equated
mere speech with the crime of intending to sell drugs for non-approved uses, the 2011 Draft
Guidance makes clear that mere speech is not illegal per se, but only problematic when it can
be construed as evidence of intent to introduce misbranded and unapproved drugs into interstate commerce. This may be one reason why the government did not seek an en banc review
of the Second Circuit panel’s decision in Caronia, preferring to defend its stance in a case
where both the jury instructions and the government’s arguments made this distinction more
clear.
204 2011 DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 16, at 7–8. The material in this and the following
paragraphs is excerpted from the FDA’s guidelines without quotations because of the presence
of numerous technical terms of art.
205 Id. at 9.
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questor, (b) records regarding the information provided to the requestor,
and (c) any follow-up inquiries or questions from the requestor.206
To fall within the FDA’s proposed safe harbor for responses to public, unsolicited requests for off-label information, the pharmaceutical
firm must meet several requirements. First, the firm should respond only
when the request pertains specifically to its own named product (and is
not solely about a competitor’s product). Second, a firm’s public response to public unsolicited requests for off-label information about its
named product should be limited to providing the firm’s contact information and should not include any off-label information.207 Instead, the
firm’s public response should (1) indicate that the question pertains to an
unapproved or uncleared use of the product, (2) state that individuals can
contact the medical/scientific representative or medical affairs department with the specific unsolicited request to obtain more information,
and (3) provide specific contact information for the medical or scientific
personnel or department (e.g., e-mail address, telephone number, facsimile) so that individuals can follow up independently with the firm to obtain specific information about the off-label use of the product through a
non-public, one-on-one communication. Third, representatives who provide public responses to unsolicited requests for off-label information
should clearly disclose their involvement with a particular firm. Fourth,
responses to public unsolicited requests for off-label information should
not be promotional in nature or tone.208
In our view, there are aspects of the FDA’s proposed safe harbor
that provide a good starting point for beneficial reform of the off-label
marketing rules, but they are woefully incomplete. Most pointedly, the
rationale behind the public/nonpublic dichotomy seems questionable.
The central underlying public policy concern is balancing the societal
benefit of the dissemination of truthful information into the marketplace
with or without the benefits of FDA indication preapproval, not whether
a request for information on off-label use made to a pharmaceutical company was publicly disclosed or not. Put differently, the costs and benefits of off-label information dissemination seem to have less connection
to the public nature of the request as to the truth versus falsehood of the
information.
Indeed, insomuch as the public distinction matters, it seems to raise
more questions than it answers. Specifically, the potential impact on
206

Id.
Essentially, all this does is turn a public request into a non-public conversation. There
seems to be no mechanism for a company to direct members of the public to otherwise publically available information, which is strange in light of the public interest in the free flow of
information. This is particularly concerning in light of the fact that a patient/consumer cannot
“buy” the drug in question without first getting a physician to prescribe it.
208 2011 DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 16, at 8.
207
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prescribers and consumers could vary extensively between different
“public” forums. The 2011 Draft Guidance lumps together questions at
live presentations,209 posted questions on web sites,210 and responses by
a firm on its own web site211 as “public.” But the potential audience of
the information in each of these can vary widely. For example, attendees
at a conference may constitute a particular subset of the public as a
whole—i.e., medical doctors—and as such, may interpret responses by
the firm in a very different manner than ordinary consumers.
Viewed in light of the public interest justification of benefitting society from having prior regulatory approval, truthful information made
available to the general public by a firm—e.g., on its web site—should
be treated differently from statements spoken in a public atmosphere
where the audience is composed of specialists. This is all the more important when information is communicated orally rather than in writing.
Written communications—which might include oral presentations that
are recorded and made available publicly—have the potential to influence a much wider audience than those made solely in oral presentations.
As we explain in the following section, the distinction between written
and oral communication should play a role in the development of more
fundamental reforms to the regulation of information about off-label uses
of prescription drugs.
B. Principles for Reforming Regulation of Off-Label Marketing of
Prescription Drugs
1. Truthfulness and Transparency
Given the dangers of criminal prosecution of pharmaceutical companies and their representatives for misbranding, off-label prescription
drug use remains a proverbial “third rail” within the halls of drug companies and a “dirty little secret” within the overall healthcare marketplace.
As a result, companies often do not attempt to quantify or even acknowledge the off-label use in their business dealings and forecasts. In the
pharmaceutical industry, off-label use is sometimes euphemistically referred to as “spontaneous use,” but the reality is that off-label decisions
by physicians are anything but spontaneous and are subject to malpractice liability if made inappropriately. A 2006 study of 150 drugs revealed that off-label use ranged from 1% to 46% within therapeutic
classes.212 Only 7% to 54% of off-label use was supported by what the
209

Id. at 4.
Id.
211 Id. at 4–5.
212 David C. Radley, Stan N. Finkelstein, & Randall S. Stafford, Off-label Prescribing
Among Office-Based Physicians, 66 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1021 (2006).
210
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authors would consider “strong scientific support.”213 Put another way,
21% of the 725 million prescriptions studied were for off-label uses.214
Fully 73% of the off-label uses lacked any “firm scientific” evidence.215
As off-label prescriptions are often well-thought-out medical decisions,
Congress and the FDA have been reluctant to prevent the practice of
prescribing a drug for uses that have not been approved by the FDA.
We agree with the FDA that all written and oral off-label information must be truthful, non-misleading, accurate and balanced. As discussed in Part III.B.3, we suggest that any off-label oral discussion must
be always preceded by, and based on the distribution of, the appropriate
printed documentation. The liability for disseminating false or misleading information should squarely fall on the company and its agents. The
learned intermediary doctrine216 should not be available to protect drug
companies from product liability claims based on off-label uses promoted in response to solicited or unsolicited requests for off-label
information.
But there remains a significant gap in the marketplace of information. Companies, investors, and the public have a vested interest in
knowing how drugs are used. We propose that the FDA adopt regulations requiring pharmaceutical manufacturers to measure and deliver a
statistically validated report of drug usage by indication that quantifies
the amount of off-label use for its product. If total off-label use represents more than say 5% of new or total prescriptions, the company
should be required to break out the off-label use into its sub-uses. If an
individual off-label use exceeds a specified percentage of overall use or a
specified dollar threshold, then the company should be required to submit a supplemental New Drug Application. The FDA should impose
fines that penalize any drug company for significant and persistent offlabel use of its product without providing sufficient, accurate, and balanced information to the marketplace.
This proposal builds on the suggestion in Western States Medical
that one alternative to a complete ban on advertising compounding drugs
is to limit the total amount of compounding.217 It also parallels the Securities Exchange Act requirement that once an issuer has more than
2,000 holders of record or 500 non-accredited holders of record and as213

Id. at 1024
Id. at 1023.
215 Id.
216 See generally, e.g., Robert J. Friedman, Take Two of These and Sue Me in the Morning: Efficacy of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine in Prescription Drug Failure to Warn
Cases, 22 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 278 (2009) (discussing the learned intermediary doctrine in the
context of prescription drug failure-to-warn cases).
217 Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, 535 U.S. 357, 372 (2002).
214
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sets in excess of $10 million, it must register that class of securities under
the Securities Exchange Act and provide periodic reports.218
2. Differentiate Based on the Sophistication of the Listener, the
Speaker and the Type of Information
The FDA’s current approach to off-label promotion is over-inclusive because it bans the dissemination of truthful scientific and medical
information to sophisticated listeners who are not only capable of making
informed treatment choices but who actually make the final decision to
prescribe medication to patients. It also minimizes the benefits a broader
audience would gain from easier access to truthful information upon request and fails to reflect the training of the speaker and the different
types of off-label information provided. Our approach strongly affirms a
company’s right to distribute truthful and non-misleading off-label information to the marketplace when the benefits of that information for a
given class of listener outweighs the risk of harm to the patient. As a
general rule, the greater the sophistication of the listener and the speaker
and the more independently reliable the information, the less restrictive
the FDA limits on dissemination should be.
The 2011 Draft Guidance offers no protection when a drug representative solicits a request for off-label information when meeting oneon-one with a physician. This encourages an artificial context in which
the sales representative and physician “dance around” the topic of offlabel information. Yet why should it matter whether the physician or the
representative initiates the discussion as long as the information provided
is scientific and not unduly promotional in nature? It is difficult to see
how any public interest is harmed by the accurate disclosure of truthful
scientific information. The pursuit of knowledge that has undergone validation, testing, and acceptance by the scientific community arguably
constitutes the type of commercial speech that is most worthy of protection under the First Amendment.
As the Supreme Court recognized in Sorrell, physicians are sophisticated consumers of medical and scientific information who are better
able to evaluate such information and to weigh the costs and benefits of
unapproved uses than untrained recipients of that information. For that
reason, the FDA should permit drug sales representatives to offer solicited or unsolicited off-label scientific information (which we classify further in the following Subsection) to a Tier I recipient, which we define as
a medical professional with a medical degree (i.e., M.D. or D.O.) from
an accredited medical school with a state medical license in good standing. The Tier I medical professional is akin to the sophisticated investor
218

15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1)(A) (2006).
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who is able to fend for himself or herself and is eligible to receive offers
of unregistered securities in a private placement under section 4(a)(2) of
the Securities Act without the need for a prospectus.219
There are significant discrepancies in the training of the various
medical audiences that influence an individual listener’s ability to comprehend and safely interpret the information provided. For that reason,
we would prohibit the unsolicited dissemination of off-label Class 2 or 3
promotional information (see discussion of classes of information infra
Part III.B.3) to (1) Tier II medical practitioners, which we define as professional medical care providers who are not Tier I medical professionals, such as a physician assistant or nurse practitioner, who have legal
authority to prescribe medications and a license in good standing, or (2)
Tier III healthcare workers, non-Tier I or II individuals whose main responsibilities are directly interacting with patients or working within an
institution primarily in direct contact with patients (e.g., those working in
medical offices, hospitals, clinics, physical therapy departments, and
long term care facilities).
The justification for distinguishing between Tier I and Tier II/III
providers is that medical doctors have sufficient education and experience to understand the mechanisms by which prescription drugs operate.
Medical doctors have a more in-depth understanding of pathophysiology,
i.e., how a patient’s body will respond to medication in scenarios other
than those for which the drug has received approval. Nurse practitioners,
physicians’ assistants, and similarly situated healthcare providers typically lack this level of knowledge and understanding.
We would, however, permit Tier IV medical stakeholders, which we
define as healthcare payers or other industry stakeholders with direct
knowledge and interest in the healthcare business, including health insurance issuers, pharmacy benefit managers, group health plans, and federal
or state governmental agencies, to receive solicited and unsolicited offlabel information. The key difference between Tier II/III and Tier IV is
that payers cannot prescribe any medication, whereas nurse practitioners
and physician assistants have the ability to prescribe. Payers should have
access to information regarding off-label use in order to facilitate payments and the provision of funding, but since they are unable to prescribe, there is no harm in giving them full exposure to this information.
A key aspect of our proposal is that we would prohibit the distribution of any off-label information at the initiative of pharmaceutical companies to Tier V consumers, that is, unsophisticated individuals, such as a
lay patient, a caregiver, or a legal guardian for the patient. However, we
agree with the proposal in the 2011 Draft Guidance to permit the distri219

15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2).
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bution of information that is otherwise publicly available in response to a
Tier V consumer request. All written information provided, as per the
2011 Draft Guidance, however, will be greatly restricted in its appearance and provided with appropriate contact information for a learned/
sophisticated intermediary if follow-up questions exist from them or any
medical professional they enlist. The responsibility of either intermediary is to ensure that the less sophisticated listener is protected from harm
and educated appropriately to balance the information given. As will be
done for all protected off-label information shared in the marketplace,
copies should be numbered and trackable to ensure that any attendant
liability can be traced. Similar to the status quo, companies will be
strictly prohibited from dissemination of non-publically available off-label information to Tier V consumers.
3. Types of Protected Disclosures and Prescribed Formats
Although the FDA has provided some guidance about the appearance and disclosures required for off-label information, we believe that
stronger and clearer guidance is needed. Drawing analogies from regulation of the financial markets, we propose that the FDA classify the various types of information and restrict dissemination based on the
prospective listener’s needs and ability to easily identify and assess both
the risks and benefits of the content. We also suggest varying formats
for dissemination depending on where the information is situated on the
spectrum from pure science to pure commercial promotion.
We suggest the FDA define a series of classes of information.
Class 1 information would consist of promotional materials regarding
labeled indications. The existing legal regime applies to this type of information. Class 2 information would consist of peer-reviewed publications regarding off-label use. The definition of a peer-reviewed
publication may be taken from section 401 of the now-expired Food and
Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, which permits the distribution of medical information regarding new uses as long as it includes, among other requirements, a list of articles from “a scientific
reference publication or scientific or medical journal.”220 The distribution of such articles must maintain a non-adulterated appearance (i.e., the
information should not be tailored or changed in any way), and all funding or potential conflicts must be clearly acknowledged. We also propose that, similar to SEC-guided financial reports, each document be
numbered and printed using a color-coded border identifying the document as discussing an off-label use and that such document be available
only for Tier I medical professionals. These documents will be required
220

21 U.S.C. § 360aaa(b)(6)(B) (2006).
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to be filed with the FDA and must use only an FDA-approved border
scheme. Distribution records of the recipients and the time and place of
distribution should be kept by the manufacturer and possibly submitted
to the FDA upon request.221
Class 3 information would consist of non-peer reviewed medical
articles or publication of clinical results intended to inform medical professionals. To qualify as permissible disclosure, all information should
be narrowly tailored to address the specific issue or clinical result the
company would like to disseminate. Such documents should be granted
FDA approval prior to sharing in the marketplace, akin to an offering
circular pursuant to a Regulation A offering.222 Similar to Class 2, these
non-peer-reviewed articles must be printed on paper identifying this material as discussing off-label indications and be available for use only by
Tier 1 medical professionals. The FDA might also consider further
formatting requirements to minimize the promotional appearance of
Class 3 information. For instance, Class 3 documents might be required
to use only black and white text and charts, similar to the requirements
for a tombstone advertisement under the securities laws.223
4. Additional Responsibilities for Firms Disseminating Off-Label
Information
Because drug companies are the most significant financial beneficiaries of off-label product use, they should bear the responsibility for
assuring that accurate and appropriately crafted information is delivered
to the market. We suggest that the FDA subject any pharmaceutical
company pursuing an off-label information dissemination strategy to four
ongoing requirements: training, monitoring, reporting, and auditing.
As for training, we suggest that firms be required to supply documented training of all speakers224 on the printed material and the regulations for oral discussion. To that end, we suggest developing a formal
registration accreditation program for sales representatives similar to the
221 The 2011 Draft Guidance provides a helpful list of recordkeeping requirements. See
2011 DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 16, at 9.
222 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.252(g) (2013) (providing for SEC approval of offering statements, including the offering circular, by rendering them qualified after 20 days unless the
SEC intervenes); id. § 230.253 (specifying the required contents of an offering circular under
Regulation A, the conditional small issues exemption).
223 See id. § 230.134 (providing that an advertisement containing only the most basic
factual information about an issuer and an offering does not constitute a prospectus). The
2011 Draft Guidance supplies a list of requirements for the transmission of unbiased information which can provide inspiration in this context. See 2011 DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 16,
at 8–9.
224 The speakers will primarily be registered sales representatives who ultimately are responsible for the majority of the interactions, but all other paid representatives/agents of the
company should also be included.
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Series 7 exam. All company training materials should be on record with
the FDA for discretionary review but should not necessarily require FDA
approval for use. Training does not necessarily need to be done in person but can be performed via technological means. Currently, many
sales representatives go through training for peer-reviewed studies for
approved indications, during which they are told how to respond to certain types of questions and to whom to refer questions they cannot answer. The purpose of the training requirement is to ensure that a
representative is adequately prepared regarding the off-label information
he or she is presenting to a doctor.
Second, the activities of speakers should be regularly reviewed and
monitored by company sales training personnel and management with
written documentation of results. It is essential to ensure that the representatives are accurately conveying the information regarding off-label
use. Such monitoring is particularly justified in the context of off-label
marketing because patient safety is at issue. This reflects the fundamental principle of transparency—ensuring that a company can demonstrate
to the FDA that it is tracking the activities of its representatives and making an effort to ensure compliance with the rules regarding the dissemination of off-label information under the tier and classification system
we previously articulated.
Third, reports tracking the dissemination of Class 2 and Class 3 protected information, as well as exception reports, should be submitted to
the FDA.225 We anticipate there will be circumstances where a registered sales representative may orally divulge off-label information without the appropriate written documents because dissemination of written
material was impractical (e.g., a sales representative in an operating
room suggests off-label use of a specific product based on specific evidence). Furthermore, we anticipate other conversations where an unsolicited question may raise an issue beyond the scope of the printed
material or a representative may become concerned that a specific conversation might have the appearance of violating the above requirements.
In such cases, the drug firm should be required to file an exception report
with the FDA. This resembles the filing required by Regulation FD
when an issuer realizes it has impermissibly selectively disclosed material nonpublic information to institutional investors.226 Exception reports
225 This is akin to the Form D that issuers must file when selling securities pursuant to the
exemptions from registration set forth in Regulation D. Form D is a brief notice that includes
basic information about the company and the offering, such as the names and addresses of the
company’s executive officers, the size of the offering and the date of first sale. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.503 (requiring the filing of Form D when an issuer relies on Rule 504, 505, or 506 under
Regulation D); id. § 239.500 (specifying the contents of Form D).
226 See id. § 243.100 (mandating disclosure to the public upon the disclosure of any “material nonpublic information regarding that issuer or its securities” to broker-dealers, invest-
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will provide the company with an important closed loop that it may audit. The reports will also provide the FDA with a trackable source of
what additional written information the market needs, thereby providing
important guidance about what should be changed or added to existing
protected material. Sales representatives should be accountable to their
employers to file this paperwork or face disciplinary action, thus giving
employers some enforceability and control to manage the speech of their
representatives that otherwise might have been encouraged by the
Caronia decision.
This reflects the importance of transparency and meeting the market’s need for information. This also benefits pharmaceutical firms because it gives them the ability to identify the issues and questions raised
by their customers and to find a way to answer such questions appropriately. Caronia is likely to have a negative impact on pharmaceutical
firms from a compliance perspective because it may encourage representatives to speak freely, beyond what the pharmaceutical company itself would prefer its representatives say. If representatives are not
submitting reports as required, the company has a legitimate reason to
discipline or terminate them. The thrust of our approach gives representatives the freedom to speak regarding off-label use under certain conditions in order to promote the public interest in the dissemination of truth,
but mandates that they also divulge such speech to the pharmaceutical
company and FDA.
Finally, we recommend that the FDA require companies to undertake a third party audit of some of the conversations with medical professionals. (Of course, there would also be a requirement to act on the
information received.) This audit should cover both the recipients and
non-recipients of off-label information. The importance of a third-party
audit derives from the need to make sure that the reports are adequate,
that representatives are in fact talking to doctors, and that doctors are
getting accurate information from the interaction, rather than receiving
misleading or otherwise inaccurate information. This four-part framework makes it more likely that the benefits to society from the limited
disclosure of truthful off-label usage information by pharmaceutical
companies and their representatives will outweigh the potential costs,
and would give such firms a safe harbor to train sales representatives and
develop predictable norms of corporate compliance.227
ment advisers, investment companies, and current shareholders who may trade on such
information).
227 Finally, it is worth mentioning that a 1935 Michigan Supreme Court decision permitted experimentation (i.e., off-label use) without malpractice liability, setting a standard for
appropriate experimentation without liability as long as the patient consented and the use did
not “vary too radically” from accepted methods of procedure. Fortner v. Koch, 261 N.W. 762
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CONCLUSION
In this Article we have discussed both the dangerous implications of
the majority’s approach in Caronia for efficient economic regulation in
general and have charted a path forward by articulating a new standard
for regulating the dissemination of information about the off-label use of
pharmaceutical drugs that would withstand constitutional scrutiny. By
anchoring this regulatory regime in promoting the public good, rather
than paternalism, and subjecting these restraints to intermediate scrutiny
under Central Hudson as long as they do not discriminate between industry participants, our approach comports with the theoretical justification
for restricting truthful commercial speech under the First Amendment
and reflects the underlying considerations motivating the Supreme Court
in Sorrell.
Indeed, as we discussed in Part II, securities regulation can serve as
a useful analogous framework for articulating a more nuanced approach
to regulating off-label marketing. Many of the challenges faced by the
two regimes are similar and reflect the fundamental tension between permitting the distribution of information that facilitates welfare-enhancing
transactions while promoting the public good by reducing the variance of
outcomes among market participants. Specific exemptions to restrictions
on offers for the sale of securities, such as the accredited and sophisticated investor categories under Regulation D, can serve as an example
for formulating similar exemptions to restrictions on the distribution of
truthful information regarding the efficacy and safety of off-label use of
prescription drugs. In Part III, we articulated a concrete proposal for
reforming the FDA’s rules on off-label marketing based on these general
principles and analogous lessons from the securities laws. Distinguishing between types of information and the intended audience is essential
to ensuring that the distribution of facts regarding off-label uses of prescription drugs furthers legitimate public interests rather than unconstitutional paternalism.
At the heart of our argument lies the fundamental point that the
majority’s approach in Caronia reflects a false dilemma. It is unnecessary to take a binary, either/or approach to regulating truthful commercial speech. Promoting the free flow of truthful information is a worthy
goal in a liberal democracy. But the potential harm to the public from
risky pharmaceutical drugs is real. Just as with the capital markets, it
takes only a few catastrophes to undermine the trust and confidence essential to the proper functioning of the pharmaceutical and healthcare
industries. Advancing a public interest such as this justifies limited re(Mich. 1935). We see this as a matter for state law and the appropriate licensing authorities
rather than as something that should be addressed through FDA regulation.
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strictions on truthful commercial speech, provided that the government
has a rational basis for doing so and the restraint itself satisfies the Central Hudson framework.
In short, as important as the free flow of information is, our society
already made the decision to reject the anti-regulatory ideology of the
Lochner era—and for good reason. As the recent financial crisis vividly
demonstrated, the absence of adequate regulation can lead to market inefficiencies and unnecessary suffering among the weakest in society.
Restricting speech is often inextricably tied to regulating underlying
transactions. The solution to the danger of excessive paternalism is to
prohibit this specific ill, not to render the regulation of advertising, marketing, and offers to transact outside the ambit of government regulation.
The purpose of the First Amendment is to facilitate political liberty and
individual autonomy, not a laissez-faire false utopia of unrestricted commercial promotion.
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